THE ICC REFORM PROCESS AND THE FAILURE TO ADDRESS THE AFRICAN STATE CONCERNS ON THE SEQUENCING OF PEACE WITH CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNDER ARTICLE 53 OF THE ROME STATUTE

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The relationship of African States with the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) is critical to the continued success of the ICC and the development of international criminal law. One of the main criticisms of the ICC, by some African States, has centered on the question of how best to sequence peace with justice, or justice with peace, in situations of ongoing conflict such as in Uganda and Sudan. This paper examines the history of the peace-justice clash on the African continent in the context of the 2019 Assembly of States Parties mandated process of ICC reform, taking into account the ICC Office of the Prosecutor’s (OTP) policy paper on the interests of justice. Regrettably, despite the longstanding African State Party concern about the peace-justice interface, the September 2020 ICC independent expert report produced for the Assembly of States Parties missed the opportunity to expressly address this important issue. The author submits that, while the OTP appears to have embraced a more nuanced view of the interests of retributive justice and how they relate to the interests of sustainable peace, it may be timely for the formal ICC review process to consider how to bring further clarity to resolution of this issue in the context of the ongoing ICC reform discussions. Formally giving the OTP some guidance on how to balance the interests of justice considerations after it begins a formal investigation into a situation should help limit some of the criticisms directed towards

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the ICC as it engages in the challenging task of dispensing justice for victims of atrocity crimes in Africa and other parts of the world.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The International Criminal Court (ICC or the Court) was established with the declared goal of helping to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community. Article 1 of the Rome Statute grants the Court jurisdiction over "persons for the most serious crimes of international concern." These crimes are genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and for some of the ICC’s States Parties, the crime of aggression. The Assembly of States Parties (ASP), which meets at least once a year, sets the general policies for the administration of the Court and provides oversight. During those meetings, the States Parties review the activities of the various organs of the ICC, discuss new projects, and adopt the ICC’s annual budget. The ASP also periodically elects the Court’s principal officials, and importantly, is also formally entrusted with addressing broad policy questions, including those related to non-cooperation.

Many African States have participated in the ASP discussions since the ICC’s establishment. At its inception, although each state had individual positions, the African States generally enthusiastically supported the work of the ICC and were optimistic about the Court’s potential to help address the impunity arising from many conflicts that were unfolding in their region. Four concerns emerged from the collective and individual statements of African States to the plenary negotiations in Rome in 1998. The four aspirations were succinctly set out by South Africa’s delegate, on behalf of the sixteen-member Southern African Development Community, at the opening day of the Rome Conference. He stated that African States desired that:

• the Prosecutor should be independent and have authority to initiate investigations and prosecu-


2. See Id. art. 5 (“The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes: (a) The crime of genocide; (b) Crimes against humanity; (c) War crimes; (d) The crime of aggression.”).
tions on his or her own initiative without interference from States or the United Nations Security Council, subject to appropriate judicial scrutiny, and the independence of the Court must not be prejudiced by political considerations;

- the Court should contribute to furthering the integrity of States generally, as well as the equality of States within the general principles of international law;

- the Court . . . should be an effective complement to national criminal justice systems and should also have competence in the event of inability, unwillingness, or unavailability of national criminal justice systems to prosecute those responsible for grave crimes under the Statute, while respecting the complementary nature of its relationship with such national systems; and

- The Court is a necessary element for peace and security in the world . . . and [its] establishment . . . would not only strengthen the arsenal of measures to combat gross human rights violations but would ultimately contribute to the attainment of international peace.³

On 1 July 2022, the ICC celebrated the 20th anniversary of the entry into force of its founding treaty. The four concerns raised by the African States in the summer of 1998 are as relevant today as they were more than twenty years ago, especially considering the fact that today, Africa constitutes the largest single regional bloc of States to ratify the Rome Statute.⁴ Many African scholars, legal experts, and, perhaps even

³. See U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, at 65, A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II) (2002) (“The establishment of an international criminal court would not only strengthen the arsenal of measures to combat gross human rights violations but would ultimately contribute to the attainment of international peace. In view of the crimes committed under the apartheid system, the International Criminal Court should send a clear message that the international community was resolved that the perpetrators of such gross human rights violations would not go unpunished.”).

⁴. Of the 123 ICC member states, 33 are from Africa, 28 Latin America and the Caribbean, 25 from Western Europe and other states, 19 from Asia-Pacific, and 18 from Eastern Europe. The States Parties to the Rome Statute,
more importantly the African Union (AU), the regional body comprised of all fifty-five African States, have voiced some concern that the ICC has primarily focused on pursuing African suspects and defendants.\(^5\) This potentially skewed focus appears troubling because, if reflective of a bias, that would be inconsistent with the underlying idea of an ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) that is required to exercise its powers with independence and impartiality. Yet further, some states have even claimed that the Court is “susceptible to political manipulation in that it has ignored atrocities committed by major world powers such as the United States and China.”\(^6\)

As a result, over the years, several African State Parties have submitted proposals to “fix” the Rome Statute system. These proposals have included amendments to the ICC Statute’s preamble to extend the application of complementarity to \textit{regional} courts, not just \textit{national} courts;\(^7\) as well as amendments to substantive provisions of the treaty, such as Article 16 of the Rome Statute, to permit deferrals of situations by the U.N. General Assembly if the currently mandated Security Council fails to do so within a six month period;\(^8\) and amend-

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6. Cannon et al., supra note 5.


ments to the irrelevance of official capacity clause under Article 27 of the Rome Statute to provide for some temporary immunity from prosecution for incumbent government officials until they are no longer in office. There have been additional African State proposals to amend the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence to permit accused persons to be excused from presence during trial in certain circumstances; as well as proposals for the extension of jurisdiction to offenses against the administration of justice to Court officials, and the clarification of the role of the independent oversight mechanism.

For various complex reasons, including a seeming failure by African States to properly motivate their proposals or to direct the necessary follow-ups to the right forum for ICC States Parties (such as the working group on amendments), nearly all the proposals have been unsuccessful. Perhaps due to the several failed proposals for amendments and partly due to the perception that the Court is being used to harass and humiliate only African leaders, there have been discussions of a collective African State withdrawal from the ICC system. To date, collective withdrawal, a concept unknown in international treaty law, has not happened. By the talk of collective withdrawal then, it appears that the reference is to a coordinated withdrawal by a number of African States acting individually. Individual African countries, such as Burundi, the Gambia, and South Africa, have tried to withdraw. Of course, as a consent-based system, individual States may withdraw from the


treaty under rules of general international law since the Rome Statute does not prohibit it. In fact, the Rome Statute expressly contemplates the process for withdrawal under Article 127.\footnote{12. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 127.}

Each of the three African States mentioned had its own reasons for seeking withdrawal which related more to domestic politics than a principled stance against the ICC itself. Burundi, which was under a preliminary examination that implicated interests of the highest State officials, proceeded to be the first country to withdraw.\footnote{13. See Manisuli Ssenyonjo, State Withdrawals from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court South Africa, Burundi, and The Gambia, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND AFRICA 214, 217–220 (Charles C. Jalloh & Ilias Bantekas eds., 2017) (“Burundi’s head of state and other state officials did not want the Prosecutor to proceed with the preliminary examination started in April 2016 into alleged crimes under the ICC jurisdiction committed in Burundi.”).}

This seemed to be in anticipation of Pre-Trial Chamber III authorization of the Prosecutor to formally investigate the situation even though the Rome Statute is clear that a State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising from the treaty, including those of a financial nature as well as those concerning criminal investigations commenced prior to the withdrawal and the duty of the withdrawing State to cooperate in respect of such investigations.\footnote{14. Id.} South Africa, which surprised many given its otherwise strong general support for the ICC, initiated withdrawal from the Rome Statute following what was seen by the government as an embarrassing local judicial ruling that South Africa had failed to comply with its obligations to arrest and surrender Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir when hosting an AU leaders’ summit.\footnote{15. See Erika de Wet, The Implications of President Al-Bashir’s Visit to South Africa for International and Domestic Law, 13 J. of Int’l. Crim. Justice 1049 (2015) (discussing the lack of basis in international law for South Africa’s decision and possible reasons for it); see also Dire Tladi, The Duty on South Africa to Arrest and Surrender President Al-Bashir under South African and International Law: A Perspective from International Law, 13 J. of Int’l. Crim. Justice 1027 (2015) (presenting further commentary on the domestic and international legal implications).} There was an initial decision to appeal the ruling to a higher court. The appeal was withdrawn with the government thereafter proceeding to file a formal withdrawal notification from the Rome Statute with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations. South Africa’s formal withdrawal notification was in turn subsequently withdrawn, following a successful legal challenge by the official opposition party and civil society organizations on 22 February 2017, which found that national parliamentary procedures for withdrawal had not been complied with by the executive branch of the government.\footnote{16}

For its part, in a symbolically important move given its status as the home country of the then-ICC Prosecutor, The Gambia rescinded its notice of withdrawal due to a fortuitous change of government.\footnote{17} The prior Jammeh government, which initiated the withdrawal process, was widely criticized for its human rights record, inside and outside Africa. The Gambian Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s 2021 report has confirmed that serious violations of human rights, including crimes such as torture and enforced disappearances, were committed during the period of Jammeh’s rule.

At the AU level, several political and legal steps have been taken at different points of the ICC-Africa relationship to counter what is often perceived as a biased court acting selectively against African leaders. One aspect of this has entailed holding an extraordinary heads of state summit to rally support for a common African position of grievance against the ICC,\footnote{18} establishing a special ministerial committee of foreign

\footnote{16. See Ssenyonjo, supra note 13, at 215 (“South Africa’s minister of international cooperation and development, acting for the executive and without seeking or receiving prior approval of the South African parliament or any public consultation, unilaterally submitted to the UN Secretary-General notification of South Africa’s withdrawal.”); South Africa’s decision to leave ICC ruled ‘invalid’, BBC News (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39050408 [https://perma.cc/J7NU-2VLE] (providing news coverage of the decision).}


ministers to coordinate political action, mobilizing diplomatic support at the United Nations for deferral requests of investigations and prosecutions in relation to the Sudan and Kenya situations, putting direct political pressure on the ICC to drop certain cases through demarches to the President of the Court, and in a marked improvement in its practice, the more recent AU appearances as *amicus curiae* in the Kenya and Sudan situations to present legal arguments before the ICC judges either of its own initiative or through acceptance of an invitation by the ICC Appeals Chamber. In the case of the Kenya situation, the AU Commission with the present writer acting as external counsel, sought standing to present legal arguments before the ICC. Interestingly, the Appeals Chamber did grant the AU Commission right of audience to make submissions but denied those of Kenya, Uganda and Namibia which had also separately applied to present their individual views as State Parties. In the Sudan situation, the ICC Appeals Chamber was more proactive and expressly invited State Parties and international organizations, including the AU, to make submissions. The AU, perhaps unsurprisingly given its members can claim to be among the most affected, was the only organization to accept the invitation although it had also long made clear its preference for “African solutions to African problems.”

The latter policy posture has been accompanied with the resuscitation of an old idea, first presented by African jurists in the late 1970s, to vest a regional

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court—what is now the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights—with jurisdiction over core international crimes, such as crimes against humanity, alongside the exercise of material jurisdiction over general and human rights matters.24

The permanent ICC, whose very existence represents the triumph of an ambitious idea—effectively initiated in 1919 but only realized in 1945, and meaningfully so in 1998—has, for the most part, been met with high and evidently unrealistic expectations of what it can accomplish. The ASP has responded to the AU concerns in part by convening a special debate on the African government concerns at a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties, in which this author was privileged to participate as an independent academic expert based upon a nomination by the African Group, and by welcoming proposals on how to address those concerns.25 As might be expected, ICC organs such as the OTP and the Presidency have also taken a strong stance defending the institution, with the ICC’s then Gambian Prosecutor (Fatou Bensouda) and then Nigerian President (Chile Eboe-Osuji) personally stressing the important ICC efforts in pursuing justice for African victims rather than for African elites.

With the Africa-ICC relationship still in a state of flux and the ASP decision in December 2019 to establish a review process in response to increasing, and perhaps hyperbolic, commentary describing the Court as being in “crisis” or “trouble,”26 friends of the ICC must ask whether it is time for a

reality check and culture change at The Hague. Not only has the ICC seemingly been unable to deliver on its promise of justice for the victims of atrocity crimes in Africa, in situations such as Ivory Coast and Kenya, the reality of what else it has actually accomplished compared to the modern ad hoc international penal tribunals that preceded the ICC seems sobering given its relatively large budget and relatively broad jurisdiction. Some even appeared to have concerns about the ICC’s future as it moved forward with politically sensitive investigations of individuals in Afghanistan and Palestine, two countries with powerful allies adverse to the ICC. So, to the question, does the ICC need some reform? The easy answer seems to be yes. This seems true, even among the 123 States Parties, including many countries from outside Africa. But, as always, principled State Party acceptance of the need for reform is just the beginning. The follow-up question becomes inevitable: what concrete changes can be made for there to be real reform at the ICC and how can such changes be made without undermining the independence of the institution?

A simple response might be that the whole institution requires a holistic review to discern areas of potential reform. That said, from an African government perspective, the role of the ICC OTP seems crucial and would likely be perceived as particularly important. The OTP is effectively the engine that drives the ICC accountability bus through its investigation and prosecution of alleged crimes. Consequently, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the OTP as an organ has drawn the ire of some dissatisfied African States and, in the context of the Sudan situation...
ation, led them to mobilize withholding cooperation from the Court as a whole. Therefore, although there are other areas that might merit attention for reform, from an African State Party perspective, a focus on the possible areas of reform in relation to the OTP and its work could be one of the most important aspects. This seems to even be an agreed point among the ASP members given the reform process also flagged the importance of that organ.

Beyond the OTP, there appears to be more that can feasibly be done to align the Court to its initial purpose and vision. Some reform suggestions have called for the establishment of an ombudsperson or other internal staff grievance procedures; gender and geographical balance in recruitment, especially at the most senior levels; enhancement of transparency in preliminary examinations, case selection, and investigations; and greater rigor and transparency in the election of judges, presidents, and vice-presidents. Moreover, since the ICC’s first two decades focused heavily on Africa, rather than dismiss offhand the African State criticisms of the ICC, it is apparent that for the Court to avoid some missteps and succeed during the next two decades (by 2042), it would be beneficial for constructive discussions of reforms to also draw on and reflect the African State experience and concerns. It is on the most important aspect of that experience that this article proposes to focus.

Structurally, the paper is divided as follows. To set the wider context, Part II will offer background on the review and reform process. Parts III and IV will then address the ICC and prior African government reform suggestions, which predated the formal ASP driven review and reform process. Part V will then turn the spotlight on Article 53 of the Rome Statute which speaks to the initiation of investigations and prosecutions and the current interpretation of the “interests of justice” by the OTP in its policy papers. Part VI discusses the ICC interpretation of the “interests of justice,” and Part VII focuses on the Security Council’s controversial use of Article 16 of the Rome Statute. Thereafter, Part VIII analyzes the peace-justice conundrum in the context of two sensitive situations to come before the ICC, those of Uganda and Sudan, contrasting the OTP position on those two situations with the OTP position on Colombia. Finally, Part IX offers a handful of preliminary proposals for reform to OTP policy, the rules of procedure, and amendments to the Rome Statute.
II. BACKGROUND: THE CONTEXT OF THE ICC REVIEW PROCESS

On June 13, 2019, the ASP Bureau held a retreat in the Netherlands to address some of the current challenges facing the Court and to explore ways in which States Parties could address them within the overall aim of strengthening the Court and the Rome Statute system. This was in response to a proposal by the three ICC principals in a May 2019 letter from the President of the ICC, Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji, to the Bureau of the ASP calling for an independent external review of the ICC’s work. About half a year later, in a resolution adopted at the Eighteenth Assembly of States Parties on December 6, 2019, the ASP formally recognized the multifaceted challenges facing the ICC and established an Independent Expert Review (IER) Panel.28

The goal of the IER Panel was to establish an “inclusive State-Party driven process for identifying and implementing measures to strengthen the Court and improve its performance.”29 Under its Terms of Reference, the IER was mandated to carry out a thorough review of the ICC under the three thematic clusters of 1) governance; 2) the judiciary; and 3) investigations and prosecutions with the goal of presenting “concrete, achievable, actionable recommendations aimed at enhancing the performance, efficiency and effectiveness of the Court and the Rome Statute system as a whole.”30 The ASP also identified four priority issues for the States Parties to directly address through standing working groups: 1) strengthening cooperation; 2) addressing non-cooperation; 3) complementarity and the relationship with national jurisdictions; and 4) equitable geographical representation and gender balance. Curiously absent from the specific topics for examination was the substantive role of the ASP and the individual ICC States Parties themselves. This seems like an omission with potentially far-reaching implications given the statutory functions reserved for the ASP to provide institutional oversight of the ICC.

29. Id. ¶ 4.
30. Id. at Annex I, ¶ 1, 2.
The IER, chaired by former Constitutional Court Judge Richard Goldstone of South Africa, presented its final report to the ASP in September 2020. This was in line with the deadline in the initial mandate and can be seen as commendable for such a potentially far-reaching assessment. On the other hand, as the process was envisaged before the global outbreak of the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic, legitimate doubts remain whether the process was not affected by the challenges of carrying out meaningful consultations under such disruptive conditions. In essence, having first convened in January 2020, the IER had the relatively short timeframe of nine months to complete its work, including consultations of relevant stakeholders, such as States Parties and civil society. The IER report, which also seemed to skip the commonsense step of having the relevant organs of the ICC review their draft report for errors as had been seen in other reviews of other tribunals, contained a large number of 384 recommendations intended for both short-term and long-term implementation. Four chapters of the lengthy IER report focus on the OTP as an organ and address a range of critical matters, including prosecutorial strategies on situation and case selection and prioritization of those cases, preliminary examinations, investigations, and even internal OTP quality control mechanisms.

Yet, in what seemed like a missed opportunity, the final report of the independent experts does not address the well-known and frequently stated concerns of African States. In a report that was about 348 pages long, including four substantive chapters which specifically discussed strengthening the OTP, and included many recommendations to that effect, the African States’ concerns were not expressly highlighted or addressed. Nor were their various reform proposals, some of which reflected the shortcomings of the prosecution’s interpretation of her power on the issue of interests of justice, formally engaged by the study. This significant omission seems to have been missed by most commentators, as the report was

generally positively received by members of the international criminal justice community. By taking up this issue, even if only in a preliminary manner, this article hopes to shine a spotlight on this missing piece of the African government’s longstanding concern in light of the expected continuation of the ICC review and reform process over the next several years.

To be clear, the goal here is not to pass judgment on the merits of the views of the African States, which vis-à-vis African academia and civil society might be contested, and sometimes hotly so. Rather, for our limited purposes, we take the African government complaints at face value. African States’ direct exposure to the ICC system over the past two decades is something the institution should wish to benefit from. At the same time, it is apparent that progress has been made on the ICC side with implicit acknowledgement that not all is well. To the credit of the ICC leadership and the ASP, their progress in acknowledging that the institution can be improved has led to implementing a process that could ultimately lead to the improvement of the ICC’s overall performance over the coming years.

This is not to suggest that even as we focus on their broad outlines there is necessarily a single African State view of the ICC. In fact, even among the African States themselves, there is a wide variety of views on any number of issues concerning international justice, including the ICC-Africa relationship itself. However, that is to be expected when one lumps the countries in the second largest continent together into one large geographic group.

Moreover, some of the more prominent criticisms of the ICC are in fact those of the regional organization, the AU, which has its own separate legal personality and does not equate to the views of the individual members. From the perspective of the Rome Statute, and for that matter international law, it is the views of the individual States Parties themselves rather than the AU as such that would officially carry more weight. The two sets of views are not the same. But they are often conflated. Therefore, attribution of a single legal position to the African region, the second largest continent comprised of around fifty-five countries, only thirty-three of which are currently parties to the ICC, should be taken with a necessary degree of circumspection. Even the official positions of the AU, which often relies on consensus (which can mean the
absence of strong objections of the few States present in the room), may in reality only reflect the views of a small group of specially interested States rather than a majority of the African countries themselves.

III. ICC Reform in the Context of the Africa-ICC Relationship and the Peace-Justice Conundrum

Since its creation, the ICC has had a complicated on-off relationship with the African States. It has, among other things, faced criticism about its regionally focused prosecutions, the challenge of how best to sequence peace and justice, the selective referrals by the U.N. Security Council, and the selective deferrals by the Security Council.32 Only more recently, perhaps partly in response to the African government criticisms, has the ICC OTP extended investigations into other regions such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh/Myanmar, and Georgia.33 The geographic spread of the ICC’s reach appears much better if the preliminary examinations are also considered.

Nonetheless, African States have still been critical. One of the harshest critiques of the Court came from The Gambia when it announced its intention to withdraw from the Rome Statute, stating that “[d]espite being called an International Criminal Court, [it] is in fact an International Caucasian


34. The OTP carries out a two-step analysis of situations. In the first part, it examines information it has, or is supplied to it through outsider submissions, whether an investigation is warranted under the legal criteria under the Rome Statute. Second, if it finds a reasonable basis to proceed, then it proceeds to a formal examination with the authorization of the Pre-Trial Chamber.
Court for the persecution and humiliation of people of colour, especially Africans.35

But the most significant African State Party criticism of the ICC has centered on how best to sequence peace with justice or justice with peace under the Rome Statute system. Used in this context, the term “peace” means a state of tranquility and the absence of violence or armed conflict. Similarly, the term “justice” means retributive or criminal justice of the kind that is typically administered by the Rome Statute system. These, of course, are only working definitions for the limited purposes analyzed here. A broader conception of justice, of the kind advocated by African States, would include additional mechanisms that are not retributive and are more restorative. The peace-justice concern, which also goes to the heart of the ICC’s core mandate to investigate and punish atrocity crimes, stems partly from the ICC’s involvement in situations of ongoing conflict in Africa and partly from the controversial interpretation of Article 53 of the Rome Statute by the ICC OTP. This is often referred to as the peace versus justice or peace and justice dilemma. We will return to this issue.

Other AU concerns relate to the applicability of the legal regime of the Rome Statute with respect to the immunity of incumbent government officials, whether from States Parties like Kenya or non-parties such as Sudan and Libya, and the implications of such application on the stability and governance of often fragile post-colonial African States. Many of the AU’s additional criticisms link the peace and justice questions to these issues or to the question of proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion. In particular, in its Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, the OTP adopted the view that the “interests of justice” are not necessarily inclusive of the interests of peace. Thus, the broader issue of peace and security is said not to fall within the OTP’s responsibility, but rather within the mandate of other institutions such as the U.N. Security Council.

The result of the peace/justice distinction is that, after ICC involvement, where circumstances change on the ground and there is a desire to, for example, temporarily halt a prosecution to give peace a chance, this opportunity for peace can only be secured through use of the deferral mechanism con-

35. Clarke, supra note 33, at 217, 229.
templated by Article 16 of the Rome Statute. Article 16 enables the U.N. Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to request the ICC to defer an investigation or prosecution for a renewable period of twelve months. The OTP’s reading of the Rome Statute therefore passes a crucial decision affecting prosecutorial discretion to an external political body over which the OTP has no control.

African States have also consistently raised the peace-justice issue, in relation to the conflicts in Uganda, Sudan and Kenya, thereby implicating the official interpretation of Article 53 of the Rome Statute. Article 53 arguably provides discretion for the prosecution to temporary halt investigations or prosecutions for reasons of “interests of justice.”

IV. PRIOR AFRICAN STATE PROPOSALS FOR REFORM AND THE LINK BETWEEN DEFERRALS AND THE PEACE-JUSTICE NEXUS

Since the Court’s inception, various actors and entities have advanced recommendations on ways to improve the working methods of the ICC and even amend the Rome Statute to strengthen practical operations. These recommendations encompass a wide spectrum of topics from victim participation in criminal proceedings to questions about the application of Articles 16 and 53.37

36. See Jalloh, Regionalizing International Criminal Law?, supra note 5 (Several African Union Assembly of Heads of State and Government decisions since 2009 have warned about the need to balance the imperatives of peace against those of justice. This article provides a detailed discussion of this peace-justice issue as well as other African State concerns voiced several years ago.)

37. See generally Just, Hassan B. Jallow, Prosecutor, UN-ICTR & UN-MICT, Statement to the United Nations Security Council (Jun. 3, 2015) (discussing the importance of complementarity and that the burden to prosecutor perpetrators of international crimes falls first to the State before it falls to the international community); Dr. Guénéel Mettraux, et al., Expert Initiative on Promoting Effectiveness at the International Criminal Court, at 1 (Dec. 2014) (stating the main areas of ICC reform related to: investigations, the confirmation process, disclosure from the ICC, admission and evidence, interlocutory appeals, orality, victim participation, deference before the ICC, institution building, and cooperation in witness protection); Moving Reparation Forward at the ICC: Recommendations, REDRESS (Nov. 2016) (recommending the ICC improve the application and procedure processes for reparations); Open Soc’y Just. Initiative, Open Letter to States Parties to the Rome Statute of the Interna-
As mentioned briefly above, Kenya also proposed an amendment to the preamble of the Rome Statute which could influence the interpretation of Article 17, governing complementarity, in an attempt to also apply the principle in relation to regional criminal courts as opposed to national courts alone.\(^{38}\) An additional proposal, which faced some pushback from African civil society as well as some governments, has been the proposal to amend Article 27\(^{39}\) of the Rome Statute in order to provide recognition of temporary immunity from prosecution for sitting African government officials even where they are allegedly implicated in international crimes. The amendment proposed provided that sitting presidents and their deputies, or anybody acting or entitled to act as such, may be exempt from prosecution during their current term of office. The AU’s Malabo Protocol initially matched its non-immunity clause to the Rome Statute standard but now contemplates a temporary exemption from prosecution for an amorphous and ill-defined category of “senior officials”.\(^{40}\)

Other African proposals concerned other issues.\(^ {41}\)
Nonetheless, it appears helpful to address the ICC reform recommendations from legal scholars who studied one of the most far-reaching proposals of African States that centered on an element of peace and justice as manifested through Article 16 of the Rome Statute. In 2010, a group of three African academics including the present author conducted an independent assessment of the African government proposed reform of the deferral mechanism under the Rome Statute. The proposal was meant to address situations where the Security Council fails to decide on the request for a deferral within six months of receipt of the request. In such a case, the requesting Party could ask the U.N. General Assembly to assume the Security Council’s responsibility consistent with the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution 377(V) of the U.N. General Assembly.

The three experts analyzed the AU proposals to amend Article 16 while also providing their own recommendations. Essentially, the AU proposal contemplated three primary ways forward for Article 16 amendments. First, the proposal, formally presented by South Africa on behalf of the African States Parties to the Rome Statute, recommended Article 16 of the Statute be amended to function as a dual mechanism that could be used by the Security Council as well as the General Assembly. The thinking behind this recommendation was as follows: Article 16 ought to be modified to provide authority to both the General Assembly and the Security Council the use of this Article, as this would be more democratic and less politicized, recognizing that the Security Council’s exercise of its Chapter VII authority is inherently political. However, the experts also recognized the “cool” reception of other ASP members regarding this proposal and, therefore, the experts did not foresee this proposal advancing. This projection, which can now take advantage of the benefit of hindsight, turned out to be correct.

43. Id. at 17.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
The second proposal was similar and suggested that Article 16 could be amended to include authority with a two-third General Assembly vote for deferral or a two-thirds ASP vote. However, the expert group recognized again the challenge for this proposal for various reasons. This included that States may be opposed to providing more U.N. organs with this authority as it could potentially spread the same political issues into two additional U.N. organs and raise constitutional problems about the allocation of competences between the General Assembly and the Security Council under the United Nations Charter.

The third proposal suggested that the ASP play an advisory role in consideration of deferrals. Deferrals could be discharged by an ASP working group which could then adopt a recommendation that could then be taken to the Security Council on behalf of the group by a State or group of States. This final proposal was seen as advantageous for several reasons, but primarily because it would remove the exclusive deferral authority from the Security Council and allow for considerations of justice to play a part in the ICC process. It could have the further merit of centering the decision on deferral requests within the Rome Statute system thereby alleviating the resort to an external body such as the Security Council over which the ICC has no legal control. Further, it was recognized that the advisory ASP organ would only be comprised of State Parties to the Rome Statute. This limitation to such decisions in an advisory group solely made up of Rome Statute members appeared to indicate that it could be potentially advantageous for African States. Additionally, this proposal identified the need for regional representation while not also having every ASP State on the advisory panel.

Despite these benefits, there were limitations. If this proposal were adopted, there was nothing to indicate that the Security Council would be bound by the ASP’s advisory recommendation on deferral. Nonetheless, the proposal appeared to
be able to provide some transparency and legitimacy to the inner workings of the ICC and perhaps even motivate the Security Council to develop some transparent criteria for the exercise of its discretion in relation to Chapter VII powers in matters involving the ICC’s accountability mission.54

The expert group then analyzed the situation in Sudan.55 Although the theoretical next steps of the ICC discussed in the paper may now be obsolete due to the recent decisions of the ICC Appeals Chamber56 and the potential for future surrender of Al-Bashir by a new Sudanese Government, the expert group’s discussion on the “interest of justice” question is still relevant today.57 It also remains relevant because, like in Sudan, there will be many ongoing conflicts that the ICC is bound to engage with in the future. The more recent efforts of Colombia to reach a peace settlement after a long civil war between the government and Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) rebels only underscores the importance of this topic and its relevance for all ICC regions beyond the African States Parties.

Returning to the Sudan peace and justice debate, the expert group recognized that the Prosecutor must be guided in her/his decision based on the guidelines set forth in Article 53 of the Rome Statute, but the group also recognized the Prosecutor could choose to have a broader range of discretion.58 In recognizing the wider breadth of prosecutorial discretion, it was argued that there are alternative mechanisms to prosecution, which have already been used by States and are familiar in international criminal law.59 The expert paper recognized that internationally supported accountability may not always

54. Id.
55. Id. at 21; see also infra notes 231, 232 (discussing the Security Council and ICC’s treatment of Al-Bashir in Sudan).
56. Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09 OA2, Judgment in the Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir Appeal (May 6, 2019) (holding that the Court had the power to exercise jurisdiction over the situation in Darfur, Sudan, based on the referral by the Security Council, and therefore that Jordan had failed to comply with the Court’s request to surrender Sudanese leader Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir).
57. African expert study on AU concerns about article 16, supra note 42, at 21.
58. Id.
59. Id. (referring to the Truth Commission in South African and the gacaca process in Rwanda).
come in the form of *prosecutions* and that justice could be pro-
vided by other alternative means without defeating the core 
purpose of criminal accountability for those allegedly bearing 
greatest responsibility for crimes before the ICC.\(^{60}\)

However, this suggestion of creating space for a wider 
range of justice mechanisms was not intended as a grant of 
impunity but instead as a recognition that justice for victims of 
international crimes and accountability for these crimes comes 
in various forms.\(^{61}\) A one-size-fits-all solution does not work 
given the variety of complex situations around the world in 
which the ICC is bound to operate at any given time. The in-
ternational community may demand investigation and prose-
cution for these crimes. That may be the goal at an early stage 
of a conflict prompting the ICC to get involved. Yet, where 
circumstances fundamentally change on the ground, it might 
not always be wise or in the best interest of the concerned 
State or even the victims to pursue immediate trials. Other 
forms of justice, such as restorative and reparative justice, 
might prove to be preferable to criminal prosecutions, at least 
in the short term. The history of transitions in different coun-
tries and regions of the world suggest that a complex array of 
punitive and non-punitive mechanisms might be more useful 
for societies seeking to transit from conflict to peace.

The expert group recognized that these alternative means 
must still have some form of legitimacy for the Prosecutor to 
exercise discretion and refrain from continuation with the ex-
ercise of the Court’s jurisdiction.\(^{62}\) The same was true of Se-
curity Council deferrals. Ultimately, in light of the current 
“peace and justice” question the expert group advanced four 
specific recommendations for African States to consider as a 
potential way forward.\(^{63}\)

First, the group recommended continued engagement 
between the AU, Security Council, ICC, and ASP.\(^{64}\) This recog-
nized that each of these bodies had an important and distinct 
but also complementary role to play in the search for peace 
and security. The Security Council, of course, enjoys a robust

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60. *Id.*
61. *Id.*
62. *Id.*
63. *Id.* at 21–24.
64. *Id.* at 22.
mandate to address issues of global peace and security including through the use of extraordinary measures pursuant to its Chapter VII authority in the U.N. Charter. The Security Council creatively invoked that power in 1993 and again in 1994, to establish international criminal tribunals to prosecute atrocity crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.\footnote{S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993); S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994).} This reopened the door to accountability for atrocity crimes at the international level after being closed for several decades following the Nuremberg Trials at the end of the Second World War.\footnote{See U.N. Secretary-General, The Charter and Judgment of the Nürnberg Tribunal – History and Analysis, at 11–12, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/5 (1949) (quoting President Harry Truman and the UN Secretary-General as they advocate for codification of the principles of the Nuremberg Charter).} That same body could also use that power to complement the ICC efforts, especially by legally requiring all States to cooperate with the ICC, at least in respect to referred situations. In its recommendation, the group recognized the need for continued cooperation between the States and the ICC to ensure that when there is a potential for Article 16 to be invoked by the Security Council, States clearly lay out the factors in favor of deferral, such as possible disruptions of an ongoing peace process.\footnote{African expert study on AU concerns about article 16, supra note 42, at 22.} Further, and this was more of a strategy point, it was proposed that African States coordinate lobbying efforts to ensure that there is a unified message for the African position.\footnote{Id. at 23.}

Second, the expert group recommended that States seeking to subject themselves to the deferral process should engage all relevant actors and engage all relevant U.N. procedures.\footnote{Id. at 23–24.} A plan had to be developed to establish what would be achieved during a deferral period and ensure transparency. This would help build political support for the deferral, including among Security Council members, so that the ICC does not get asked to suspend its work in active investigations and prosecutions of a situation temporarily with no useful purpose in mind. Such a plan, in the view of the expert group, would show good faith. It would also demonstrate that the
States seeking deferrals still take seriously their duty to provide some measure of justice on behalf of the victims of the alleged crimes potentially falling within ICC jurisdiction.

The third recommendation suggested that States subject to ICC investigation should present credible alternative justice mechanisms to the ICC Prosecutor. This would allow the Prosecutor to consider the “interest of justice”, in a concrete manner, and allow the States and the Prosecutor to collaboratively determine whether an ICC prosecution is the best option as the factual situation on the ground changes.70 This third option was notable as it did not require a treaty amendment but rather required the ICC Prosecutor to adopt new internal policies for the office, possibly including formally revisiting the Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice.71 Incidentally, we return to the merits of some basic policy recommendations towards the end of this article.

The fourth and final proposal recommended that African States Parties stress domestic prosecutions under the complementarity principle. This was because the Rome Statute expects that States be given “first-choice” to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of international crimes, so long as there was a desire to do so and a credible prosecution and judiciary in place.72 In other words, that they endeavor to use the ICC as a court of last, rather than first, resort. That is the basis of the whole Rome system. On the part of the ICC, recognizing the efforts and challenges confronting the States that actually want to follow through, by providing some type of capacity building and assistance could go some way to alleviating pressures on the institution.

Over the years there have been a number of proposals for key amendments envisaged by some States Parties from Africa to the Rome Statute system. The above discussion, which linked the debate on the use or non-use of the deferral power under Article 16 of the ICC Statute to the peace-justice interest of African States is only one such example. The focus here is merited for at least three reasons. First, it confirms that this is not a new issue that has suddenly arisen; it has been a matter of concern for several years. Second, it is an issue that could

70. Id. at 24.
71. Id.
72. Id.
arise in any region of the world that is subject of ICC’s atrocity investigation and prosecution efforts; it brings to the forefront the centrality of revisiting the peace-justice issue in the context of the present and future ICC reform discussions. Finally, it demonstrates that the notion of peace and justice and the need for the sequencing of the two sits within a legal architecture that offers potential means to address such concerns, under Article 16, with or without formal amendments to the Rome Statute. That leaves space for a focus specifically on Article 53 of the Rome Statute which implicates more directly the role of the OTP and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.

V. PEACE AND JUSTICE UNDER ARTICLE 53 OF THE ROME STATUTE

For many of the African States, which early on embraced ICC involvement in accountability challenges confronting them, the nexus between justice and peace has led to soul searching at the regional level about how best to structure a transitional process for countries torn apart by conflict. In a not so indirect rebuke, the AU initiated a process that eventually led to the adoption, in February 2019, of a Transitional Justice Policy Framework which now attempts to advance a holistic approach to transitional justice in Africa. This includes the element of how best to sequence retributive criminal justice with the search for a sustainable peace. The framework policy document of the AU now formally recognizes that in fragile post-conflict settings “a balance and compromise must be struck between peace and reconciliation on the one hand and responsibility and accountability on the other.” At least six policy considerations that should be borne in mind are then set out to provide some kind of balancing. That policy, if embraced and implemented by individual African States, may represent part of an emerging Africanization of international criminal law. This appears to show that, taking up the peace and justice issue in the ongoing reform discussions could be

73. For works detailing the history and evolution of Africa’s sentiments towards the ICC, see Charles C. Jalloh et. al., Assessing the African Union Concerns about Article 16 of the Rome State of the International Criminal Court, 4 Afr. J. Legal Stud. 5 (2011) and The International Criminal Court And Africa (Charles C. Jalloh & Ilias Bantekas eds., 2017).
74. AU Transitional Policy Paper, supra note 23, ¶ 38.
fundamental for current situations in African countries. The same is potentially true for situations of ongoing conflict or other fragile post-conflict contexts in other parts of the world, as the debates concerning other ongoing ICC situations elsewhere already demonstrate.\textsuperscript{75}

A. The Approach to Interpretation of the Rome Statute

Part of the reason for the complications in the Africa-ICC relationship was the general perception that the OTP has taken too narrow of a view of its powers conferred under the Rome Statute with respect to investigations and prosecution of core crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction. This was particularly so when it came to the activities of the OTP in the Uganda and Sudan situations, and, to a lesser extent, the Kenya situation. The issue turned on interpretations of the meaning of Article 53 of the Rome Statute.

In the interpretation of a treaty such as the Rome Statute, the starting point, including for the ICC itself, is the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).\textsuperscript{76} The VCLT provides the necessary guidance in Articles 31 and 32 in the form a general rule of treaty interpretation and a supplementary means of interpretation.\textsuperscript{77} In the VCLT scheme, first, one must examine the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.\textsuperscript{78} The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty include, but is not limited to the text, its preamble and annexes as well as any subsequent agreements and subsequent practice relevant to the interpretation of the treaty and any relevant rules of international law applicable to the relations between the parties as well as any special meanings given to a term by the parties.\textsuperscript{79}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{75} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{77} Id. arts. 31–32; Richard Gardner, \textit{Treaty Interpretation} (2nd ed. 2015).
\item \textsuperscript{78} See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Seventieth Session, ch. IV, U.N. Doc. A/73/10 (2018) (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose . . . ”).
\item \textsuperscript{79} Id.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Second, if the meaning of the term is unclear based on a plain reading of the text, recourse may be made to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 32 (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure, or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.\(^8\)

In the context of this study, the debate about Article 53 appears not so much to be about the first step of the VCLT treaty interpretation framework (the ordinary meaning of the terms) but the second (recourse to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion). This is because the ordinary language of Article 53 of the Rome Statute arguably supports a flexible interpretation that is more in line with the African State interpretation. It would appear that many scholars would share the view that alternative, or rather additional, forms of justice, such as truth commissions and consideration of matters of peace and security, can be factors that the ICC prosecution takes into account when deciding whether or not to pursue a criminal investigation, or once an investigation has already taken place, whether to pursue a subsequent prosecution.\(^9\)

\(^8\) Id. ¶ 15, at 56.

\(^9\) See, e.g., Talita de Souza Dias, ‘Interests of justice’: Defining the scope of Prosecutorial discretion in Article 53(1)(c) and 2(c) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 30 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 731, 751 (2017) (“[I]t is possible to advance that Article 53(2)(c) allows the ICC Prosecutor to balance, against the gravity of the crime and other factors weighing in favour of prosecution, all the circumstances related to any of international criminal justice’s functions, including the interests of victims, the situation of the accused, peace and security considerations, and non-prosecutorial measures.”); J.N. Clark, Peace, Justice and the International Criminal Court Limitations and Possibilities, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 521, 541–43 (2011) (“[W]hile critics of the ICC’s work in Uganda submit that peace should come before justice, the complexities and particularities of individual post-conflict societies demand contextually sensitive and tailored responses rather than general formulae.”); Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 481, 486–88 (2003) (“The most likely point at which deference could be accorded to non-prosecutorial reconciliation measures would be the exercise of prosecutorial discretion not to proceed with an investigation..."
B. *The Ordinary Meaning of Article 53 of the Rome Statute*

Consistent with the VCLT framework, we briefly start with the ordinary meaning of the relevant provision, before proceeding to seek to confirm the interpretation using supplementary means. Article 53 of the Rome Statute, which is the central provisions, provides as follows and is worth setting out in full:

Initiation of an investigation

1. The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available to him or her, initiate an investigation unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed under this Statute. In deciding whether to initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether:

(a) The information available to the Prosecutor provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed;

(b) The case is or would be admissible under article 17; and

(c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.

If the Prosecutor determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed and his or her determination is based solely on subparagraph (c) above, he or she shall inform the Pre-Trial Chamber.

or prosecution . . . Article 53(2) . . . governs the decision of the Prosecutor, following the investigation, as to whether to continue to the next stage, namely, prosecution.”). *Contra* Jens D. Ohlin, *Peace, Security and Prosecutorial Discretion*, in *The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court* 187, 189 (C. Stahn and G. Sluiter eds, 2009) (“[I]n cases of Security Council referrals, such prosecutorial discretion is inconsistent with basic principles of international law and the proper role of the Security Council.”).
2. If, upon investigation, the Prosecutor concludes that there is not a sufficient basis for a prosecution because:

(a) There is not a sufficient legal or factual basis to seek a warrant or summons under article 58;

(b) The case is inadmissible under article 17; or

(c) A prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into account all the circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime;

the Prosecutor shall inform the Pre-Trial Chamber and the State making a referral under article 14 or the Security Council in a case under article 13, paragraph (b), of his or her conclusion and the reasons for the conclusion.

3. (a) At the request of the State making a referral under article 14 or the Security Council under article 13, paragraph (b), the Pre-Trial Chamber may review a decision of the Prosecutor under paragraph 1 or 2 not to proceed and may request the Prosecutor to reconsider that decision.

(b) In addition, the Pre-Trial Chamber may, on its own initiative, review a decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed if it is based solely on paragraph 1 (c) or 2 (c). In such a case, the decision of the Prosecutor shall be effective only if confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.

4. The Prosecutor may, at any time, reconsider a decision whether to initiate an investigation or prosecution based on new facts or information.\(^\text{82}\)

The first paragraph of this provision requires the Prosecutor, after having evaluated the information made available to her, to—in order to establish the truth—\textit{initiate an investigation}

\(^{\text{82}}\) Rome Statute, \textit{supra} note 1, art. 53.
to cover all facts and evidence relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal responsibility. The Prosecutor must do so, “unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed” under the Statute.83

In deciding whether to investigate, several considerations expressed in the first paragraph become relevant and are required for her deliberation, namely, a) whether the available information provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the Court’s jurisdiction that has been or is being committed; b) whether the case is or would be admissible under Article 17 of the Rome Statute; and c) taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.84 One commentator explains that paragraph 1(a) of Article 53 aims to ensure the potential crimes are of the type admissible before the Court.85 Specifically, this provision recalls the complementarity principle and the gravity requirement.86 In considering these two elements, the Prosecutor must weigh the involvement of both groups and individual perpetrators.87 First, under the complementarity principle the Prosecutor must determine what, if any, type

83. Id. art. 53, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
84. Id. art. 53, ¶ 1(a)-(c).
85. COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 388, 389–90 (Mark Klamberg ed., 2017); See also Fatou Bensouda, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the conclusion of the preliminary examination of the Situation in Palestine, and seeking a ruling on the scope of the Court’s territorial jurisdiction, Int’l Crm. Ct. (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=20191220-otp-statement-palestine [https://perma.cc/F4JP-6XBN] (“I am satisfied that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation into the situation in Palestine, pursuant to article 55(1) of the Statute . . . However, given the unique and highly contested legal and factual issues attaching to this situation, namely, the territory within which the investigation may be conducted, I deemed it necessary to rely on article 19(3) of the Statute to resolve this specific issue.”).
86. COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 85 at 391.
87. Id.
88. Id.
of national proceedings have been conducted or are being conducted. The Prosecutor’s assessment of complementarity at the preliminary stages is without prejudice to the reconsideration of complementarity at the indictment stage.

Second, the Prosecutor must address the gravity of the alleged crimes. This assessment refers to the general gravity of the crimes of those “who may bear the greatest responsibility” and if those individuals or groups are potentially subjectable to the Court’s mandate.

Paragraph 2 of Article 53 also provides an opportunity for the Prosecutor to exercise discretion in “interests of justice,” but only following the conduct of the investigation. Unlike the first paragraph, which focuses on the initiation or start of an investigation and speaks to a decision in that regard, paragraph two addresses not prosecuting due to the interests of justice if, upon investigation, the Prosecutor concludes that there is not a sufficient basis for a prosecution. Notice that the Prosecutor bears a higher burden here than under paragraph 1, as the Prosecutor must now have a sufficient rather than reasonable basis to believe crimes have been committed within the Court’s jurisdiction. However, even where there is such a sufficient basis and the jurisdictional requirements are met, Article 53(2)(c) allows the Prosecutor to essentially balance “all the circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims, the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetra-

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 391–92.
92. Id. at 392; See Fatou Bensouda, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on concluding the preliminary examination of the situation referred by the Union of Comoros: “Rome Statute legal requirements have not been met”, Int’l Crim. Ct. (Nov 6, 2014), transcript available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-statement-06-11-2014 [https://perma.cc/J7TQ-9UVD] (closing the investigation into the Gaza Strip bombing of humanitarian aid); but see Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Statement by Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo (Oct. 14, 2005) (ICC Prosecutor statement announcing the issuing of five arrest warrants for member of the LRA and announcing the LRA crimes were of higher gravity than the crimes of the UPDF).
93. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 53, ¶ 2.
95. Id. at 395.
tor, and his or her role in the alleged crime” in the decision-making process of whether or not prosecuting a specific individual on particular charges is in the interests of justice.

The Prosecutor’s discretion under Articles 53(1)(c) and (2)(c) is broad. It has been argued that the discretion contemplated by paragraph (2)(c) is even broader than the one contained in paragraph (1)(c).96 The Prosecutor’s discretion under the former is broader due to the non-enumerated elements and the interpretation given in the OTP Policy Paper which established that, under this subparagraph, the Prosecutor could also look at other justice mechanisms as factors in justifying a non-prosecution.97 However, Article 53(1)(c) does not set out the precise set of factors that are to be considered in making the interests of justice decision while paragraph (2)(c) does mention some factors that may be considered. However, the list of factors that may be considered in paragraph (2)(c) is by no means confined to those listed since the Prosecutor is urged to “take[e] into account all the circumstances” including those factors listed.98

Unlike subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article 53 (1) and (2), subparagraph (c) provides a basis for the Prosecutor to elect not to pursue an investigation in “the interests of justice."99 It should be noted that the language of Article 53(1)(c) “treats the interests of justice as a countervailing consideration to the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, which, at the stage of the initiation of a formal investigation, following preliminary examinations, are more likely to weigh in favor of criminal proceedings.”100 The language seems clear that interests of justice are not necessarily equal to the interests of the victims or limited to retribution. Furthermore, the term “justice” is quite broad and could be used to encompass either a narrow meaning such as retributive justice

96. Id. at 396.
97. Id. at 397.
98. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 53, ¶ 2(c).
99. Id.; See COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 85, at 393 (“Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.”).
or a wider meaning that speaks to a larger scheme of restorative justice and even peace.\(^{101}\) Given the seeming lack of clarity by the drafters, there is a considerable amount of discretion left to the Prosecutor to determine the scope and meaning of the “interests of justice.”\(^ {102}\) However, this discretion is not absolute as the Prosecutor must provide “substantial reasons” for not prosecuting.\(^ {103}\) Importantly, the Prosecutor’s provided reasons are also reviewable\(^{104}\) by the Pre-Trial Chamber.\(^ {105}\)

Two possibilities are captured here. First, the State or the Security Council (in the cases of referrals), may request the Prosecutor to reconsider.\(^ {106}\) Then, the Pre-Trial Chamber may request the Prosecutor to reconsider the decision either wholly or partially.\(^ {107}\) Second, the Pre-Trial Chamber can act on its own initiative to ask the Prosecutor to review a decision taken using the “interests of justice” prong of the provision.\(^ {108}\) In this situation, if the Prosecutor decides not to investigate or prosecute on account of the interests of justice, the pre-trial judges must agree with and confirm the decision. If they do not do so, and this point is further clarified in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Prosecutor must proceed with the investigation or prosecution.\(^ {109}\) This again has been sub-

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101. See Commentary on the Law of the International Criminal Court, supra note 85, at 393 (“It is unclear as to whether the drafters envisaged a narrower conception of justice (as referring only to ‘criminal justice’) or a broader one (including ‘restorative justice’ interests”).

102. Id.

103. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 53, ¶ 1(c).

104. See Commentary on the Law of the International Criminal Court, supra note 85, at 397 (“In addition, the Pre-Trial Chamber may, on its own initiative, review a decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed if it is based solely on paragraph 1 (c) or 2 (c). In such a case, the decision of the Prosecutor shall be effective only if confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.”).

105. See Commentary on the Law of the International Criminal Court, supra note 85, at 397 (“In addition, the Pre-Trial Chamber may, on its own initiative, review a decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed if it is based solely on paragraph 1 (c) or 2 (c). In such a case, the decision of the Prosecutor shall be effective only if confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.”).

106. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 53, ¶ 3.

107. Id.

108. Id.

109. Id. art 51.
ject to mixed views due to the lack of clarity within the provision.110

Finally, and especially important for our purposes in light of the African government arguments about better sequencing of peace with justice, paragraph 4 of Article 53 provides the Prosecutor with power to reconsider, at any time, a previous decision to not investigate or prosecute “based on new facts of information.”111 The final provision is crucial since the ICC is continuously investigating situations that are currently in conflict. Therefore, there may be an opportunity for the Prosecutor to temporarily postpone or halt an investigation or prosecution in light of a current peace process and nonetheless retain the authority for later prosecutions if the peace process were to collapse. The decision taken at one phase can be revisited at a later stage. The language does not suggest the decision, once taken, is irreversible.

C. The Foundation provided by the International Law Commission and the Drafting History of Article 53

Interests of Justice Standard

The above analysis focuses on the plain meaning of the text of the Rome Statute. It seems useful now to review the drafting history of what eventually became Article 53 to establish if it might be possible to confirm the ordinary reading suggested in the preceding section. A better understanding of the original purpose of the provision’s inclusion in the Rome Statute helps explain whether, and if so, how the article can be better interpreted and better applied by the OTP and the rest of Court within the ICC system. Lessons learned from that review of the preparatory works could then feed into reform proposals for the Rules of Procedure and/or for future policy papers on the “interests of justice”.

110. See Commentary on the Law of the International Criminal Court, supra note 85, at 398 (“However, the existence of such a power, in the absence of any express decision not to proceed, has occasionally been contested by the Prosecutor.”).

111. Id. at 399; See also Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, re-opens the preliminary examination of the situation in Iraq, Int’l Crim. Ct. (May 13, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-statement-iraq-13-05-2014 [https://perma.cc/4ZRU-TTQX] (deciding to re-open preliminary investigation based on the submission of new information eight years after the investigation first closed).
Of course, having gone back and forth for several decades, it was in 1981 that the U.N. General Assembly again requested the International Law Commission (ILC) to resume its study on the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.\textsuperscript{112} The study was linked closely to the question of international criminal jurisdiction, a matter that had been on and off the ILC agenda for decades going back to the late 1940s.\textsuperscript{113} Based on this request, the ILC subsequently worked on defining some core international crimes, led by the Senegalese jurist Doudou Thiam in his capacity as Special Rapporteur, laying the foundation of what would become the Rome Statute based on the draft codes presented in both 1994 and 1996.\textsuperscript{114} Interestingly, within the ILC’s first draft articles in 1994 there was no mention of the “interests of justice” nor was there any mention of the “interests of justice” within the General Assembly debates.\textsuperscript{115} It appears this is because in the ILC draft there was a provision that discussed the powers of the Prosecutor to initiate investigations upon the receipt of a complaint. That provision then had to include a caveat of circumstances in which the Prosecutor could decide that there was no basis for further action by the Court. This decision, as framed then, would then be reviewable before the Presidency.\textsuperscript{116} The question was complicated because it was linked to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion which was seen as independent and paramount.\textsuperscript{117}  

\textsuperscript{115} Bitti, \textit{supra} note 114, at 2.
\textsuperscript{116} Id.
\textsuperscript{117} Id. at 2–3.
The language “interests of justice” did not appear in the July 1994 ILC draft and was also not proposed in the Ad Hoc Committee of the UN General Assembly established to study the ILC draft. That remained the case until 1996. In the 1996 preparatory discussions, the United Kingdom’s discussion paper proposed an amendment to ILC draft Article 26 (later Article 53). The British delegation proposed that the Prosecutor, in the context of deciding whether there is a sufficient evidentiary basis to proceed or to determine the admissibility of a case, be conferred wide discretion to decide when not to investigate despite evidence of international crimes occurring. This proposal was meant to encompass specific cases. In the proposal, the United Kingdom suggested the conferment of “wide discretion on the part of the prosecutor to decide not to investigate comparable to that in (some) domestic systems.” For example, when a suspected offender was very old or very ill, the Prosecutor could exercise this discretion. Significantly, the proposal also included a catch all, stating, “or if, otherwise, there were good reasons to conclude that a prosecution would be counter-productive.”

Further, the preliminary 1996 discussions solely related to the “interests of justice” discretion being used only after the investigation stage and before prosecution. However, by 1997 the preparatory meetings had expanded the discussion to include the “interests of justice” discretion at both the investigation stage and before prosecution.


120. Id.


The 1997 proposals also required the Prosecutor to consider the victims and gravity of the crime in relation to the “interests of justice,” requirements. These proposals were ultimately added to the adopted Rome Statute provision and importantly, created affirmative considerations for the Prosecutor.

During the final negotiations in 1998, the language of what would eventually be Article 53 remained consistent and continued to provide the Prosecutor discretion at both the investigation and prosecution stages. Although the article remained consistent in its language, the provision was not without concern. So much so that, in the Report of the Working Group on Procedural Matters, a cursory footnote explained that States were concerned with the “interest of justice language.” While it is notable that this comment was included, reasons for the concerns were not elaborated. Potential concerns could have included the vagueness of the concept of interests of justice and that the concept’s malleability could be abused in the first international court that would subject all member States to its jurisdiction.

In the absence of official travaux préparatoires for the Rome Statute, the perspective of participants in the negotiations at Rome is generally seen as useful and assists in filling gaps. The same is true even for the ICC judicial interpreta-

126. Bitti, supra note 114, at 5.
129. See Julian Davis Mortenson, The Travaux of Travaux: Is the Vienna Convention Hostile to Drafting History?, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 780, 785 (2013) (“To speak of a text’s meaning in the abstract is either incomplete or incoherent. . . . the core problem of treaty interpretation was to decipher the mean-
tion of its own statute with ample references to the works of those who were present at Rome. It is useful, against such a wider context, to refer to Gilbert Bitti, a member of the French delegation, who offers helpful insights in this regard.\textsuperscript{130} His essays helpfully trace, among other things, the origins and evolution of this important language that eventually found its way into the ICC Statute. He recalled the origin of the language and explained that fear was expressed that the more influential States would be able to use this “interests of justice” language to their advantage and avoid investigation and prosecution for the purpose of protecting their own nationals.\textsuperscript{131}

Moreover, there were apparently repeated concerns by smaller States that they would not be able to capitalize on global influence and would be subjected to the Court’s jurisdiction more often than their more influential peers.\textsuperscript{132} The delegate recalled the discussions in this regard and the strong opinion of some States that such a provision could impair the prosecution mandate of the Court.\textsuperscript{133} However, these concerns were ultimately alleviated by the implementation of a procedural mechanism to include the Pre-Trial Chamber, thereby ensuring the Prosecutor’s discretion was not unchecked.\textsuperscript{134} Furthermore, in terms of framing the statutory obligation, the requirement that the Prosecutor demonstrate that the prosecution or investigation was not in the interest of justice was seen as an extra barrier between the Prosecutor

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{131} Bitti, \textit{supra} note 114, at 7.
\item \textsuperscript{132} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{133} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{134} See Preparatory Comm. for the Int’l Crim. Ct., Rep. of the Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Crim. Ct., U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (Nov. 2, 2000) (“The Rules of Procedure and Evidence are an instrument for the application of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, to which they are subordinate in all cases. In elaborating the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, care has been taken to avoid rephrasing and, to the extent possible, repeating the provisions of the Statute.”)
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
and this exercise of discretion.\textsuperscript{135} The nature of the duty was framed negatively, not positively.

Ultimately, the preliminary negotiations and final language contained in the Rome Statute appear to confirm that States were concerned about the Court’s authority and the Court’s susceptibility to potential political influence from States. Now looking forward approximately twenty years, since the statute entered into force, it seems clear that the negotiating States’ concerns were valid and that they were in some ways predicting the Court’s complicated future. This is because the vagueness of the interests of justice standard has raised issues in practice, including but not only, for African States.\textsuperscript{136} The OTP’s decision not to halt their proceedings in the Uganda and Sudan situations, when some African entities were so requesting, came under scrutiny based on the perception that the ICC was choosing to continue the OTP proceedings at the risk of hindering the peace processes in those countries.

At the same time, it should be evident that even by the terms of the language of the initial proposals, it was an intentional choice to provide considerable, if not substantial, leeway to the ICC Prosecutor if there are, in the words of the UK proposal, “good reasons to conclude that a prosecution would be counter-productive.”\textsuperscript{137} This language, which seemed to have been embraced by other States since the British proposals were eventually included in the Rome Statute, suggests that a relatively large margin of discretion was left for the Prosecutor to determine what to do in a situation even after the ICC has carried out an initial investigation. This is not to say that, on the other end, the margin would be so wide as to allow the prosecution to undermine their own function by constantly declining to investigate or prosecute cases if that proved to be politically more convenient.

\textsuperscript{135} Bitti, supra note 114.


\textsuperscript{137} United Kingdom, \textit{UK Discussion Paper International Criminal Court Complementarity}, supra note 118, ¶ 30.
In any event, if the factual circumstances of a situation changed, there would seem to be nothing to preclude the Prosecutor from changing their mind and discontinue cases that could be counterproductive to the accountability and other legitimate purposes sought by the ICC. In the end, several themes are apparent from the preamble and text of the Rome Statute as well as the instrument as a whole. Retributive, deterrent, and preventative functions are all part of the overarching statutory scheme. This has led one thoughtful commentator to conclude that the object and purpose of the ICC seems consistent with the view that “alternative justice mechanisms, peace and security considerations and other objectives of international criminal justice, could be in the ‘interests of justice.’”

The preceding view appears to also be confirmed by the text and purpose behind paragraph 4 and indeed of Article 53. Indeed, it may be that, where the Prosecutor does not find sufficient basis for a prosecution, the Prosecutor could rely on the interests of justice as well to justify a prosecution. In some respects, it is ironic that where the ICC is now operating, mostly in Africa, States Parties that might not have been perceived as sufficiently powerful seek to invoke the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Not so much to avoid accountability or to confer impunity, but rather, as a way to stave off the possible further commission of international crimes. No wonder that African States would reject an unyielding interpretation of Article 53 that fails to accommodate changed or changing circumstances on the ground, which may in their view require the short term interests to secure peace and stability to be prioritized over a preference for issuance of indictments and prosecutions of individuals at least in a limited set of situations.

139. De Souza Dias, supra note 81, at 747.
140. See, e.g., U.N.S.C., supra note 20, at 6 (requesting a deferral of the prosecution of the President and Deputy President of Kenya “[i]n light of the peace and security situation in Kenya and the Region . . .”).
141. Id.
In the OTP Policy Paper, the Prosecutor argues the interest of justice is mainly about the retributive process, which is why peace, which plays into a broader scheme of justice, may not be considered. This interpretation by the Prosecutor, though at first blush eminently reasonable in light of the express statutory role of the OTP to pursue investigations and prosecutions of Rome Statute crimes, seems unnecessarily narrow and may be contradictory to the intent of the drafters of the ICC Statute. As explained above, when the United Kingdom proposed adding the “interests of justice” language to the Rome Statute the intention was apparently to provide broad discretion to the Prosecutor in determining when a situation would not be in the interest of justice to proceed. Moreover, the drafting history further seems to confirm that the United Kingdom’s proposal was intended to allow the Prosecutor to not prosecute when “there were good reasons to conclude that a prosecution would be counter-productive.” The keyword in the United Kingdom’s proposal seems to be the use of “counter-productive” which should be interpreted in light of the Court’s overall mandate. The mandate of the ICC is to provide accountability for perpetrators of grave international crimes and to provide justice to victims of atrocity crimes. Thus, these broad themes seem to give space to consider both retributive justice and the broader aspects of justice such as restorative justice. Sight should not be lost of the fact that, unlike other courts that preceded it, the ICC even provided a means of reparations for victims of crimes including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation and even a trust fund. Such means go beyond just jailing convicts and expressly contemplates repairing the needs victims may have, including repairing their injuries through payment of reparations. Therefore, when the Prosecutor’s interpretation of the term is considered within drafter’s context and the statute as a whole, the Prosecutor’s narrow interpretation is hard to sustain.


The Prosecutor further justifies the narrow policy position on the interaction between peace and justice by suggesting that the consideration of a potential political issue would politicize a Court that was mandated to remain independent. Such concerns should be taken seriously. Although it is true that the Court must remain an independent body, if its mission is to have a chance of success, the Prosecutor seems to imply equating the considerations of a potentially political issue with being a political body. The Prosecutor assumes that if his office were allowed to consider peace, the Court would evolve into a political body.

There are difficulties with this position. For one thing, such a position forgets that in the drafting history of Article 53, the States imposed an oversight mechanism on the prosecution when exercising its discretion under the interests of justice. As established in the drafting history, briefly reviewed above, the Pre-Trial Chamber was given a role in reviewing the exercise of the Prosecutor’s broad discretion. Therefore, if a situation were to arise in which the Prosecutor used purely political motivations for applying Article 53 discretion without legal reasoning, the Pre-Trial Chamber could deny the request and require more legal reasoning from the Prosecutor. The oversight mechanism within the Pre-Trial Chamber further supports the Prosecutor having broad discretion and being able to consider peace as part of the interests of justice. If the Prosecutor would become too political, the oversight mechanism in the Pre-Trial Chamber should, all things being equal, “reign-in” the Prosecutor as part of its exercise of its judicial review function. Indeed, in national criminal prosecutions, where there is a longer history of prosecutorial authorities weighing and balancing different factors before proceeding with cases in at least some jurisdictions, prosecutors often have to consider other policy interests in their investigative and charging decisions. These range from narrow more technical factors about likelihood of securing convictions in their cases to broader policy considerations. The latter would include the

144. OTP, Interests of Justice Policy Paper 2007, supra note 142.
availability of resources to whether the prosecution in a given case achieves the purposes of the criminal law to other even much wider societal considerations. The consideration of these non-legal or extralegal factors does not make the ultimate decision a political one.

Therefore, given that the ICC Prosecutor’s interpretation of the “interest of justice” is arguably in opposition to the intent of the drafters, it should not be applied as such. One might go so far as to argue that it should be considered “manifestly absurd or unreasonable” as per Article 32 of the VCLT.\(^\text{146}\) Although it has been argued that manifestly absurd or unreasonable is a high threshold, it can arguably be met here.\(^\text{147}\) The interpretation can be seen as manifestly unreasonable because it is both in contradiction to the intent of the drafters and in contradiction to the mandate captured in the preamble of the Rome Statute.

D. A Subtle Shift?—The OTP Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritization

It was nearly ten years later when the Prosecutor published her 2016 Policy Paper on case selection and considerations that would guide the Prosecutor’s decision in whether to pursue a case.\(^\text{148}\) Although the paper only briefly addresses the interests of justice, the newly expanded consideration of the Prosecutor may be relevant to States when requesting the Court or the Security Council to defer prosecution. The Prosecutor explained the purpose of the policy paper was to improve transparency between the working methods of the Court and the public.\(^\text{149}\) This is a laudable policy stance. Additionally, the Prosecutor explained that there is a difference between a “situation” and “case,” as the latter refers to a specific incident and the former refers to general temporal, territorial,


\(^\text{149}\) Id. ¶ 3.
and personal matters. The paper provides new enumerated considerations that solely apply to “cases.”

In explaining the intent of the OTP, the Prosecutor reiterated that as in the 2007 Policy Paper, the Prosecutor must at all times be guided by the mandate of the Court as established in the Rome Statute’s preamble. Moreover, she continued to reiterate that the goal of the Statute is to “combat impunity and prevent the recurrence of violence” and that the Court could fulfill this goal by both prosecutions at the ICC and by assisting and encouraging national proceedings. Further, the Prosecutor stated that the Court would “cooperate with States who are investigating and prosecuting individuals who have committed or have facilitated the commission of Rome Statute crimes.” Although the Rome Statute mandates complementarity and deference to national proceedings, this explicit statement by the Prosecutor is important as it recognized the cooperation of the Court with domestic proceedings, which prioritizes legitimate national proceedings over ICC prosecutions.

The Policy Paper also establishes that the selection of cases must be guided by independence, impartiality, and objectivity. First, concerning independence, the Prosecutor stressed the importance of ensuring all actions by the OTP are made irrespective of the wishes of certain State actors. Specifically, the Prosecutor identified that although a Security Council referral and State comments would give the Prosecutor authority to investigate and prosecute, the Prosecutor was not required to investigate and prosecute simply because it was given the authority to do so. Moreover, the Prosecutor is not limited to the information presented in these referrals when deciding if a prosecution is appropriate. This is surely the correct legal position, which is also in line with the expectations of an independent prosecutor.

150. Id. ¶ 4.
151. Id.
152. Id. ¶¶ 5–7.
153. Id. ¶ 7.
154. Id.
155. Id. ¶ 16.
156. Id. ¶ 17.
157. Id. ¶¶ 17-18.
158. Id. ¶ 18.
Second, the OTP must remain impartial in its case selection. The Rome Statute in Articles 21(1) and 42(7) mandate that the Prosecutor acts uniformly in all circumstances and applies a standard set of processes, methods, criteria, and threshold in all cases. Additionally, although speaking more to treatment of all persons equally, Article 27 requires that uniform application of the law requires the Prosecutor to disregard official capacity when determining if a person should be subjected to the Court to the extent the state is a party.

Discussing impartiality, the Prosecutor explained that despite the application of the same principles, every situation was different and there would not always be the same outcome. The latter is surely correct. In any event, it was stated that the Prosecutor could not pursue a case for the purposes of parity. This latter comment is relevant to the historical criticism that international tribunals have acted as “victor’s justice” courts in which only the “losing” side of the conflict has been prosecuted. The Prosecutor’s position here clearly establishes that despite this known criticism, the OTP should not attempt to prosecute both sides of a conflict unless conduct by both sides genuinely falls within the jurisdiction of the Court.

Third, the Prosecutor’s decision to select a case must be objective and based on an evidence-driven assessment. This evidence-based process requires the Prosecutor to develop a hypothetical case in which both the incriminating information along with exonerating information is considered. Further, before applying for an arrest warrant, the Prosecutor must consider whether the evidence presented during the investigation stage has a “reasonable prospect” of conviction.

159. Id. ¶ 19.
160. Id. ¶¶ 19-20.
161. Id. ¶ 19.
162. Id. ¶ 20.
163. Id.
164. Id. ¶¶ 24-28.
165. Id. ¶ 21.
166. Id. ¶ 22.
167. Id. ¶ 23; see also Richard Goldstone, Acquittals by the International Criminal Court, EJIL: TALK! BLOG OF THE EUR. INT’L. L. (Jan. 18, 2019) https://www.ejiltalk.org/acquittals-by-the-international-criminal-court/ [https://perma.cc/E4UN-38AH] ("Before issuing arrest warrants against leaders that result in their incarceration for many years, lengthy trials and high expectations on the part of victims, prosecutors must be satisfied that their cases
Fourth, the Prosecutor must abide by the legal criteria established within the Rome Statute. Under the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor must ensure there is proper jurisdiction, admissibility, and that the prosecution is supported by the interests of justice. In relation to jurisdiction, the Prosecutor has an enumerated list of trigger mechanisms that can place a case before the Court. Overall jurisdiction of the Court is merely a procedural element with limited factual considerations, whereas admissibility requires a heavy fact-based analysis of the situation. Admissibility requires the Prosecutor to consider both complementarity and the gravity of a specific case. When assessing complementarity, the Prosecutor stated that this is an evolving analysis that can be revised based on new facts, but that the Prosecutor must determine if there are legitimate State proceedings that are either investigating or prosecuting the specific case.

Moreover, the Prosecutor imposed a higher burden on itself for considering the adequacy of complementary prosecutions, requiring the Court to defer to national prosecution unless the national prosecutions are almost non-existent. Once the complementarity assessment is carried out, the Court must then determine if the crimes are of the level of gravity that is required by the Court. The latter is a very broad analysis allowing the Prosecutor to use both quantitative and qualitative values in determining if there is sufficient gravity. Finally, the Prosecutor must consider the “interests of justice.” Unfortunately, the Prosecutor’s consideration of this issue lacks elaboration and full consideration as the Prosecutor simply referred to the 2007 Policy Paper on the topic and reiterated the

against the defendants, in the absence of rebutting evidence, establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

169. Id.
170. Id. ¶¶ 29–31.
171. Id. ¶ 29.
172. Id. ¶¶ 30, 31.
173. Id. ¶ 31 (“If the national authorities are conducting, or have conducted, investigations or prosecutions against the same person for substantially the same conduct, and such investigations or prosecutions have not been vitiated by an unwillingness or inability to genuinely carry them out, the case will not be selected for further investigation and prosecution.”) (emphasis added).
174. Id. ¶ 32.
importance of considering the interests of victims and the ability of the Court to protect victims under the Rome Statute.\footnote{175}{Id. ¶ 33.}

Although the Prosecutor’s analysis of how the OTP should select cases is not necessarily new, the consideration of case selection conjunctively with case prioritization is insightful. Within the same Policy Paper, the Prosecutor discusses how cases will be prioritized within the Court.\footnote{176}{Id. ¶ 47.} As a statutory matter and a practical matter the Court cannot prosecute all cases that fall within its jurisdiction, therefore, there must be some system to guide selecting which cases, from which situations, should be prosecuted and when.\footnote{177}{Id. ¶ 49.} The Prosecutor identified five prioritization criteria: (a) a comparative assessment across the selected cases, based on the same factors that guide case selection; (b) whether a person, or members of the same group, have already been subject to investigation or prosecution either by the Office or by a State for another serious crime; (c) the impact of investigations and prosecutions on the victims and affected communities; (d) the impact of investigations and prosecutions on ongoing criminality and/or their contribution to the prevention of crimes; and (e) the impact and the ability of the Office to pursue cases involving opposing parties to a conflict in parallel or on a sequential basis.\footnote{178}{Id. ¶ 50.} The first and second points seem to be repetitions of enumerated requirements already within the Rome Statute under admissibility and complementarity. However, the third, and fourth seem to provide broad discretion to the Prosecutor to consider the impact of prosecution on conflict and how peace may play a role.

The third point may be especially relevant for African States. Some have argued that ensuring peace should be the priority before prosecutions.\footnote{179}{AU Transitional Policy Paper, supra note 23, ¶ 43.} The former can sometimes be more important to many victims who have endured decades of civil war. This point has also been recognized in the African Union’s Transitional Justice Policy regarding the need for the
peace process first to end ongoing violence and remove the possibility of future violence.\footnote{180. Id.}

The fourth element, addressing the impact of prosecutions on future crimes, should not be underestimated. Perhaps the best example of this consideration is Sudan. During the Sudanese conflict, the Sudanese government was in peace negotiations with the rebel groups, but once the ICC approved the arrest warrant for President Al-Bashir, the rebels refused to continue peace negotiations with a “war-criminal.”\footnote{181. See Sudanese rebels call on Libya’s NTC to arrest Bashir during Tripoli visit, ALARABIYA NEWS (Jan 8, 2012), https://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012%2F01%2F08%2F187049 [https://perma.cc/E8TL-4VYZ] (“Sudanese rebels seeking to overthrow President Omar al-Bashir have asked Libya on Sunday to arrest the accused war criminal during his visit to Tripoli.”).} The loss of a chance for a peace agreement between warring parties would inevitably mean that the civil war would continue, ultimately resulting in more violence, more victims, and more conflict. The continual perpetuation is in opposition to the mandate of the ICC and its purpose of deterrence. This situation seems like a prime example, assuming peace actually had strong prospects, of when the ICC Prosecutor’s non-prosecution would have been better for victims in the long-term.

In addition to the prioritization of cases, the Prosecutor also determined that the Office would consider the “operational viability” of the case.\footnote{182. OTP, Case Selection Policy Paper 2016, supra note 148, ¶ 51.} These considerations include (a) the quantity and quality of the incriminating and exonerating evidence already in possession of the Office, as well as the availability of additional evidence and any risks to its degradation; (b) international cooperation and judicial assistance to support the Office’s activities; (c) the Office’s capacity to effectively conduct the necessary investigations within a reasonable period of time, including the security situation in the area where the Office is planning to operate or where persons cooperating with the Office reside, and the Court’s ability to protect persons from the risk that might arise from their interactions with the Office; and (d) the potential to secure the appearance of suspects before the Court, either by arrest and surrender or pursuant to a summons.\footnote{183. Id.} Finally, the Prosecutor noted the possibility to reevaluate the case at any time.
These considerations by the OTP seem to recognize the recent difficulties the ICC has faced in both State cooperation in the surrender of suspects, such as President Al-Bashir, and more broadly in the additional cases in which the individuals are still considered at-large.

VI. ICC Chambers’ Interpretation of the “Interests of Justice”

Based on concern that the Prosecutor’s authority may be used to institute frivolous prosecutions, the drafters of the ICC Statute added into Article 15 “checks and balances” subjecting the exercise of the *proprio motu* power of the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation to oversight by judges who must provide authorization of an investigation before it can proceed.184 Recently, the scope of this article has come under scrutiny in the Pre-Trial Chamber decision on the Situation in Afghanistan.185 The Pre-Trial Chamber was faced with a request by the Prosecutor to start an investigation on the grounds that she believed there was a reasonable basis to believe various international crimes within ICC jurisdiction had occurred.186 The Pre-Trial Chamber acknowledged that the initiation of an investigation had the lowest standard of review, with the Prosecutor needing only demonstrate that there is a “reasonable basis to proceed” which the Chambers have previously defined as a finding of “sensible and reasonable justification for a belief that a crime falling within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed.”187 Moreover, it construed this standard to be interpreted with consideration of the mandate of Article 15(4) which is to ensure that the Prosecutor does not proceed with “unwarranted, frivolous, or politically motivated investigations that could have a negative effect on [the Court’s] credibility.”188

186. *Id.* ¶ 5.
187. *Id.* ¶ 31.
188. *Id.*
Furthermore, the Pre-Trial Chamber determined it had an affirmative duty to find that the initiation of an investigation would be in the interests of justice.\textsuperscript{189} The Pre-Trial Chamber ultimately determined that based on the evidence presented by the Prosecutor there was a reasonable basis to believe international crimes within ICC jurisdiction had occurred.\textsuperscript{190} However, the Pre-Trial Chamber did not authorize the investigation despite also finding there were no domestic proceedings occurring and that the crimes were of sufficient gravity to be admissible within the Court’s jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{191} The Pre-Trial Chamber denied the authorization of an investigation on the grounds that such an investigation was not in the interests of justice. In its consideration, the Court considered “(i) the significant time elapsed between the alleged crimes and the Request; (ii) the scarce cooperation obtained by the Prosecutor throughout this time . . . (iii) the likelihood that both relevant evidence and potential relevant suspects might still be within reach of the Prosecution’s investigative efforts.”\textsuperscript{192} Further, the Pre-Trial Chamber noted the considerable political complexity of the situation and the cost of resources for the investigation in the Court’s dwindling budget.\textsuperscript{193} Therefore, mostly on the grounds of lack of feasibility for justice, the Court denied the Prosecutor’s request to initiate an investigation.\textsuperscript{194}

The Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision to deny an investigation was reversed by the Appeals Chamber.\textsuperscript{195} The Appeals Chamber reversal held that considerations under Article 15 of the Rome Statute do not require the considerations listed in Article 53, specifically the interest of justice question.\textsuperscript{196} Although the Appeals Chamber did narrow the scope of the Pre-Trial’s authority to exclude the interest of justice considerations, this

\textsuperscript{189} Id. ¶ 35.
\textsuperscript{190} Id. ¶ 48.
\textsuperscript{191} Id. ¶¶ 72–76.
\textsuperscript{192} Id. ¶ 91.
\textsuperscript{193} Id. ¶¶ 94–96.
\textsuperscript{194} Id. ¶ 96.
\textsuperscript{195} Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17 OA4, Judgment on the appeal against the decision on the authorization of investigation into the situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Mar. 5, 2020).
\textsuperscript{196} Id. ¶ 34.
could provide a new opportunity for the Prosecutor to revisit its own considerations of the “interests of justice” in light of the reasoning provided in the Pre-Trial and Appeals Chamber decisions. It is also noteworthy that there is a leadership change at the helm of the OTP.\textsuperscript{197} This presumably gives fresh impetus to reconsider the ICC’s experience 20 years after the entry into force of the Rome Statute.

VII. THE SECURITY COUNCIL’S USE OF ARTICLE 16

Although no formal public reports by the Security Council have been provided on its consideration of the “interests of justice” question, the organ’s use of Article 16 may provide insight on the Security Council considers when determining if a situation raises concerns for international peace and security. The use of this power, which ultimately signals peace can sometimes be prioritized over immediate criminal prosecutions, can therefore be instructive.

The first invocation of Article 16 by the Security Council was at the behest of the United States during the early days of the Court.\textsuperscript{198} Resolution 1422 is notable not only for its swift enactment, less than two weeks after the Rome Statute’s entry into force, but also for its vagueness.\textsuperscript{199} Although the resolution did not directly relate to the United States and referred generally to the Court not pursuing any cases “involving current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State not a Party to the Rome Statute” it was known that this resolution was adopted at the request of the United States.\textsuperscript{200}


\textsuperscript{198} ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 174 (3d. ed. 2014).

\textsuperscript{199} Id.; S.C. Res. 1422 (July 12, 2002).

request for a twelve-month deferral of the nationals of non-Party States was then extended the following year.201

The deferral resolutions driven by the request of the United States seem in stark contrast to the Kenyan request for a Security Council deferral. In Kenya’s request for deferral, it submitted a formal letter justifying its request on the ground that prosecution of post-election officials would disrupt peace and potentially encourage violence regionally in the Horn of Africa and East Africa.202 Moreover, the request was supported by forty-five African States.203 Despite the extensive support for the deferral it was ultimately denied with only seven votes for deferral and eight abstentions.204 The explanatory statements of the abstaining eight States are notable and demonstrate the tensions in the Security Council at the time.205

The request for deferral did not gain support. But the explanations of the votes provide some insights. They confirm differing readings of the intention behind Article 16 and whether the threshold of a threat to peace and security under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter had been met thus triggering its applicability. For example, Luxembourg believed the situation needed to amount to a threat to regional peace and security, whereas Argentina, Australia, and the United Kingdom, demanded a higher threshold of a threat to international peace and security.206 In regard to Luxembourg’s concern, the question could be asked what more could have been provided to raise the threat to regional peace and security than the signature of forty-five African States stating that if Kenyan leaders were removed it would be a threat to regional peace.207

Other States, such as the United States and Korea justified their abstentions by stating that the proper place for this dis-
discussion was not within the Security Council, but within the ASP. This final reasoning seems perhaps more deferential to the ICC and its States Parties and could be welcome. At the same time, if the OTP is taking the position that the Security Council can act on matters of peace, then we might have the paradoxical situation of each of the responsible entities taking no responsibility to act. This could lead to a vacuum on both sides that should not exist since the Security Council has explicitly been given such a mandate under Article 16 of the Rome Statute and in accordance with its functions in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Although the ASP may be another forum for these discussions to occur, and less sensitive since it is at least made up of the ICC States Parties, this does not mean that the ASP as a forum could assume the Security Council’s responsibility to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security in the post-World War II system (a role that is rooted in the U.N. Charter itself).

Overall, the decision on Kenya’s deferral request demonstrates a lack of clarity on what is required for an Article 16 request to be granted. It suggests that, while there could be clear situations where threats to international peace will be manifest (for example, the conflict in Sudan), there will also be situations, such as Kenya, where that will not be the case. Unfortunately, this is the extent of insight that is publicly available on the Security Council decision process as there is no indication that the prior AU request for deferral in the Situation in Sudan was ever voted on.

208. Id. at 8, 10.
209. See G.A. Res. 68/305 (Sept. 16, 2014) (failing to acknowledge the denial of the deferral request by Kenya and the request for referral in the situation Sudan by the AU); See also A.U. Dec. Assembly/AU/Dec.493(XXII), Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of the Decisions on the International Criminal Court, ¶ 6 (Jan 30-31, 2014) (expressing its “deep disappointment that the request by Kenya supported by AU, to the United Nations (UN) Security Council to defer the proceedings initiated against the President and Deputy President of the Republic of Kenya in accordance with Article 16 of the Rome Statute of ICC on deferral of cases by the UN Security Council, has not yield the positive result expected”).
VIII. Case Study on ICC Interactions with Three Situations on Peace-Justice Concerns

When the ICC was initially created its foundation stemmed from the work of the tribunals in Nuremberg, the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. For the most part, the conflicts had ended or were about to end when those ad hoc courts were established. However, the ICC’s situation substantially deviates from these tribunals in that it operates in current-conflict situations whereas its predecessors operated predominantly in post-conflict situations. This distinction between conflict and post-conflict situations provides an added layer of complexity to the operations of the Court as justice can look different at each of these stages of a conflict. This diverging view of justice in an ongoing conflict is the basis in which a large part of the African government argument is based. The African government position does not argue for impunity over peace, but rather a more deferential approach to national and regional groups in determining the timing and sequencing of peace and justice.

To fully appreciate the African position, a brief analysis of the situations in Uganda, Sudan, and Colombia is useful. The challenge of seeking justice and how the situation in Colombia is ultimately attempting to address the goal of justice without jeopardizing the prospects of peace confirms, if there was any doubt, that this is not an issue specific to Africa. Rather, this issue will likely arise in other ICC situations so long as a conflict is ongoing, irrespective of the region. This shows the importance of understanding this matter with an eye toward the future. Perhaps, the manner in which the more recent non-African situation of Colombia has been dealt with offers, if it leads to a good outcome in future, the hope that the OTP may be adopting a more nuanced and arguably more realistic view of peace and its relationship with justice. The African States might wish to support the position taken on the Colombian peace process in relevant ASP discussions given the promise it

210. For examples of where the ICC based its foundation, see the cases Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment (May 21, 1999) and Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
holds for the continent and what it might portend for the success of the ICC itself.

A. Uganda and Sudan

First, the situation in Northern Uganda is an interesting example. Uganda was an early signatory to the Rome Statute and the first self-referral by a State Party to the ICC. The Ugandan referral to the ICC has faced criticism as it was a referral to investigate the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). This immediately generated criticisms because of the implication that crimes committed by government forces might not be captured within the scope of the referral. The Prosecutor’s response to the Ugandan government clarified that the referral would apply to the whole of the situation. Although the situation was later retitled to the referral of the situation in Northern Uganda, the five arrest warrants ultimately produced were solely related to the LRA.

In the Prosecutor’s justification for these arrest warrants, he established that throughout the process of the investigation it became apparent that there was evidence that the LRA committed crimes against humanity and war crimes in Northern Uganda. Further, the Prosecutor stated that the gravity of the crimes was “much higher” than the gravity of the crimes allegedly committed by the Uganda People’s Defense Forces (UPDF). The Prosecutor has yet to return to the investigation of the actions of the UPDF. The longer time passes, the more unlikely it seems that the Prosecutor ever will.

215. Id. at 1–2.
The Ugandan relationship with the ICC Prosecutor remained strong until the Ugandan government attempted to broker a peace deal with LRA, which would include domestic prosecutions rather than extradition to the ICC. The position of the Prosecutor during the peace talks with the LRA seemed more concerned with the ability of the ICC to prosecute the LRA members than the concern for peace, which would have included some domestic prosecutions. If the Ugandan government had been able to conclude a peace deal with the LRA and agree to domestic prosecutions or to amnesties, this could have made the LRA cases at the ICC inadmissible under the complementarity principle. The Prosecutor clearly opposed this idea. It was reported that he even went as far as saying he would “fight any admissibility challenge in Court” regardless of the apparent genuineness of the domestic prosecutions.

The Prosecutor’s strict approach in this regard can be criticized for seemingly being aimed at ensuring the ICC received credit for prosecuting alleged war criminals rather than focusing on its mandate of accountability and statutorily required deference to genuine national prosecutions (in line with the complementarity principle). It should be noted that in 2006 Uganda went on to amend its domestic Amnesty Act to allow for certain individuals to be excluded from amnesty eligibility. Specifically, the 2006 amendments allowed for the Minister to declare an individual ineligible for amnesty, however, the declaration would not be finalized until it was affirmed by the Ugandan parliament. However, the 2006 amendment did not provide for specific circumstances in which a person may be considered ineligible for amnesty, such as crimes under international law. Instead, the revision left room for broad discretion on behalf of the Minister and parliament.

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217. Id.
218. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 6–7.
some to believe that the Ugandan government was seeking a way to give some perpetrators of the civil war amnesty while still ensuring high-level offenders, like Joseph Kony, were nonetheless prosecuted by the ICC. 222 Despite the initial optimism surrounding the amendment, the Ugandan government did not use this provision to exclude Kony from receiving amnesty. Instead, as stated earlier, in an attempt at peace, the Ugandan government offered Kony “total amnesty” as an “olive branch” at the beginning of the peace negotiations. 223

The Ugandan leaders explained that the offer of total amnesty to Kony was an effort to garner peace and end a nineteen-year long civil war. 224 Although such a grant of amnesty would arguably be in contradiction to obligations owed under the Rome Statute, the Ugandan government has made other efforts to further develop the international rule of law in its country through the creation of the International Crimes Division within the High Court of Uganda. 225 The creation of this special division can not only help strengthen and develop the domestic jurisprudence relating to international crimes, but it also allows Uganda to have a stronger argument to the ICC for complementary prosecutions in the future.

Second, the situation in Sudan is notable given the Security Council’s exercise of its Chapter VII powers to refer a non-State Party for an investigation by the Court. 226 The situation with Sudan quickly escalated to direct tension between the ICC and the AU when the ICC Prosecutor sought the issuance of an arrest warrant for the sitting President Al-Bashir for allegedly committing crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes in Darfur. 227 Immediately after the arrest warrant for President Al-Bashir was issued, albeit for only some not all of

223. Id.
224. Id.
the charges requested, the AU issued a decision stating its deep concern about the indictment and urged the Security Council to exercise its authority under Article 16 of the Rome Statute to defer consideration of the issue for 12 months.\footnote{228} Despite the AU’s request the Security Council did not vote on the request for deferral, which subsequently led the AU to publicly announce that it “deeply regrets” the Security Council not using its Article 16 authority and it once again reiterated its request for deferral by the Security Council.\footnote{229} Moreover, in the same decision, the AU expressly urged all AU Member States not to comply with the request to execute the arrest warrant for President Al-Bashir.\footnote{230} Since the issuance of the arrest warrant, President Al-Bashir, who before he was deposed, traveled to several African States, was never arrested and surrendered to the ICC.\footnote{231} The non-cooperation of African States reflects the collective AU decision that had been taken at Sirte, Libya in 2008 which expressly requested African States not to cooperate with the ICC in relation to the arrest and surrender of the Sudanese leader.\footnote{232}

\footnote{228. A.U. Dec. Assembly/AU/Dec.221(XII), Decision on the Application by the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor for the Indictment of the President of the Republic of Sudan, ¶ 3 (Feb. 1-3, 2009).}


\footnote{230. A.U. Dec. Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XII), ¶ 10 (July 1-3, 2009).}

\footnote{231. Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-139, Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure of the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Dec. 13, 2011); Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-302, Decision under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by South Africa with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al-Bashir, ¶ 16 (July 6, 2017); Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-309, Decision under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by Jordan with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al-Bashir, ¶ 4 (Dec. 11, 2017); Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09 OA2, Judgment in the Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir Appeal, ¶ 1 (May 6, 2019).}

\footnote{232. See Elise Keppler, Managing Setbacks for the International Criminal Court in Africa, 56 J. Afr. L. 1, 2–3 (2011) (“The call for non-cooperation in Presi-
Although the ICC Appeals Chamber has determined that the immunity of President Al-Bashir was implicitly waived via the Security Council referral, in a recent decision regarding Jordan, the African Union has nonetheless supported African States non-compliance with the arrest warrant, partly based on the legal justification that President Al-Bashir enjoyed immunity under customary international law.\textsuperscript{233} Despite the Appeals Chamber judgment, the AU has maintained its decade long position requesting that the Security Council defer President Al-Bashir’s case for twelve-months, and now, clearly contrary to

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the ruling of the Appeals Chamber, instructed African States Parties to the ICC to not comply with the arrest warrant.\textsuperscript{234}

Further, it could even be argued that the Sudanese government was perceived as an “enemy” of the Court because it was not a State Party to the Rome Statute and it was only subject to the Court’s jurisdiction by a Security Council resolution.\textsuperscript{235} It likely did not help the relationship between Sudan and the ICC when the Sudanese government alleged the Court was being used by Western States to influence the governmental relations in Sudan, followed by billboards in Sudan stating its disdain for the ICC Prosecutor and disregard for the charges.\textsuperscript{236} The Sudanese criticism appeared partially correct because even if the Court is not directly intending to change a government, it is at least doing so in an implicit manner because the removal of a sitting President for prosecution at the ICC will, at minimum, have the effect of placing another Head of State in authority.\textsuperscript{237} Further, it remains contentious whether the indictment of the sitting President at the time did more harm than good to Sudan. Not only did it result in the first tense standoff between the AU and the ICC, but it is reported that Sudanese rebel groups began to refuse peace negotiations because it gave them an opening to argue that they could not negotiate with a “war criminal.”\textsuperscript{238}

B. Colombia

The situation in Colombia, which came many years after Uganda and Sudan, had a rather different interaction with the ICC. Colombia, like many other States before the ICC, has faced a long-enduring internal conflict between government


\textsuperscript{235} Nouwen & Werner, supra note 216, at 951.

\textsuperscript{236} Id. at 955.

\textsuperscript{237} Id. at 955-56.

\textsuperscript{238} Id. at 957. See Sarah M.H. Nouwen, Sudan’s Divided (and Divisive?) Peace Agreements, 19 HAGUE Y.B. INT’L L. 113 (2011); see also Regionalizing International Criminal Law?, supra note 5, at 465 (discussing the AU’s prioritization of peace then justice).
forces and armed groups for nearly fifty years.\textsuperscript{239} Although the conflict began its “final” peace process as early as 2005, there were still armed groups that continued to operate autonomously.\textsuperscript{240} The OTP began investigating the situation in Colombia in June 2004.\textsuperscript{241} Colombia had become a signatory to the Rome Statute in 2002 while providing a declaration excluding war crimes until 2009.\textsuperscript{242} Therefore, pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute the Prosecutor’s preliminary investigation focused on the alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by government forces, paramilitary groups, and rebel groups.\textsuperscript{243}

In 2011, the OTP presented a preliminary report on the alleged activities.\textsuperscript{244} Prior to the report, the Prosecutor received eighty-six communications related to the situation in Colombia, of which only sixty-nine were within the Court’s jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{245} The preliminary analysis determined that there was a “reasonable basis to believe” that crimes against humanity had been committed and that war crimes “may” have been committed.\textsuperscript{246} The Prosecutor continued to address the current actions of the Colombian government to hold individuals accountable for these egregious crimes.\textsuperscript{247} The Prosecutor recognized that the Colombian government had initiated proceedings against illegal armed groups, paramilitary leaders, police and army officials, and politicians associated with armed groups.\textsuperscript{248}

In light of the work of the Colombian government to indict and prosecute perpetrators of international crimes, the Prosecutor decided that she would continually monitor the sit-

\textsuperscript{240} Id. ¶ 64.
\textsuperscript{242} Id.
\textsuperscript{243} Id.
\textsuperscript{244} OTP, Rep. of Preliminary Activities 2011, supra note 239, ¶¶ 61-87.
\textsuperscript{245} Id. ¶ 61.
\textsuperscript{246} Id. ¶¶ 72–73.
\textsuperscript{247} Id. ¶ 81.
\textsuperscript{248} Id. ¶¶ 74–82 (discussing the various indictments and prosecutions that had occurred).
uation, but at the same time welcomed the efforts of Colombia and supported the exercise of the complementarity principle.249 While the Prosecutor was deferential to national efforts, the Prosecutor did not discontinue the investigation into Colombia and noted that there was no basis to believe the current prosecutions were disingenuous, but wisely argued that she would nonetheless “continue to monitor the commission of new crimes and the judicial developments.”250

In 2012, the OTP once again reviewed the status of the situation.251 The 2012 report acknowledged the continuing efforts in Colombia to prosecute the leaders of the conflict and the notable guerilla groups the FARC and Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN).252 The Prosecutor recognized the use of transitional justice mechanisms that allowed former combatants to surrender and confess their crimes in exchange for lower sentences.253 In total there had been 218 FARC prosecutions, twenty-eight ELN prosecutions, and an unspecified number of in absentia prosecutions of senior leaders of the FARC and ELN.254

Moreover, the Prosecutor stated it would have expected more prosecutions under a confession-based system, but this delay in prosecution did not mean that there was an unwillingness on the part of the Colombian government to prosecute.255 However, there was some inadequacy in prosecutions relating to crimes of sexual violence. Out of the entirety of the proceeding, only four related to crimes of rape and other sexual violence.256 Finally, the Prosecutor stated that considering the work by the Colombian government, the Prosecutor’s next steps would be to follow the Colombian legislative initiatives on peace and accountability and to follow the proceedings re-

249. Id. ¶ 85.
250. Id. ¶¶ 85–87.
252. Id. ¶ 108.
253. Id.
254. Id. ¶ 109.
255. Id. ¶ 111.
256. Id. ¶ 116.
lating to paramilitary groups, forced disappearances, sexual violence, and false-positive cases.257

By 2013, the Colombian prosecution and efforts towards peace had further developed to active peace talks between the Colombian government and the FARC.258 The peace talks could be considered successful, as there had been a settlement on two of the six issues surrounding a peace agreement.259 The Prosecutor addressed the wide variety of legislative action the Colombian Congress had taken in an effort to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes.260 The Prosecutor’s office had also conducted visits to Colombia to assess the proceedings and the Prosecutor herself had met with President Juan Manuel Santos to discuss peace and justice in Colombia.261 Finally, the Prosecutor concluded that over the next year her office would continue to monitor the proceedings within Colombia and follow any cases that may fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction.262

In 2014, the Prosecutor continued to monitor the work of the Colombian government in prosecutions for various international crimes and further conducted two in-person consultations with the Colombian government.263 Once again, because the Colombian government was taking active steps to prosecute those most responsible, the ICC elected not to issue any indictments and stated that it would continually monitor the national prosecutions.264

In 2015, the Prosecutor provided two notable interactions during its annual assessment of the situation in Colombia. First, while participating in the national discussions relating to peace in Colombia, the ICC Deputy Prosecutor James Stewart gave a keynote speech providing insight on the role of the

257. Id. ¶¶ 118–119.
259. Id.
260. Id. ¶¶ 134–35.
261. Id. ¶¶ 147–150.
262. Id. ¶¶ 151–152.
264. Id. ¶¶ 128–131.
Prosecutor in Colombia. The Deputy Prosecutor in his speech noted that the ICC was intended to be a “court of last resort” and that the duty to investigate and prosecute international crimes vested in the State Party prior to vesting in the ICC.

Further, the Deputy Prosecutor stated that “[t]ransitional justice measures offer broad scope” so long as these measures comply with the mandate and purpose of the ICC. The Deputy Prosecutor continued to recognize that transitional justice mechanisms aim to ensure accountability, justice, and reconciliation, which most commonly occurred through criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, and institutional reforms. The Deputy Prosecutor continued to address the specific situation in Colombia and the deference the ICC prosecutor must give to national prosecutions under the complementarity principle.

In addition, he explained that due to the continued perpetration of international crimes the Prosecutor elected to keep open the preliminary investigations into Colombia without formally starting an investigation, as the Colombian government had not yet demonstrated they were unwilling or unable to prosecute these crimes, therefore, the complementarity principle prohibited the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction. Although, the Deputy Prosecutor noted that the prosecutions for the most accountable were continuing there was not complete accountability in relation to sexual violence crimes and false-positives crimes, which raised concerns for the Prosecutor. The Deputy Prosecutor was clear in his concern that if false-positives were not further investigated or prosecuted, these were of the type of crimes that could be subject to the ICC’s

266. Id. at 2.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 4–5.
269. Id. at 6.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 7.
jurisdiction if national officials failed to hold these individuals accountable.272

Additionally, the Deputy Prosecutor provided insightful information on the Prosecutor’s ability to consider the peace ramifications in pursuing justice at the ICC. It was stated that peace negotiations could affect national proceedings, which could ultimately impact the Prosecutor’s considerations for “discharging” its duties in light of national prosecutions.273 In order for the Prosecutor to discharge her duties in light of national prosecutions the proceedings must “not [be] undertaken merely to shield persons concerned from criminal responsibility; do not suffer from an unjustified delay that is consistent with an intent to bring the persons to justice; and are conducted independently and impartially in a way that is consistent with the intent to bring the persons to justice.”274 As the Colombian government had executed prosecutions in absentia for leaders of the FARC and ELN, the proceedings were subject to execution of sentences to satisfy the genuineness requirement.275

Finally, the Deputy Prosecutor addressed the “interest of justice” consideration that had notably “generated some confusion.”276 An important distinction was made establishing that the question of the “interest of justice” is a question posed after a case is determined to be admissible, in that there are no adequate national proceedings occurring.277 Moreover, the question of “interest of justice” is not a question of complementarity, as complementarity was intended to relate to the admissibility of a case.278 Further, it was reiterated that the Prosecutor was required to consider the statutory considerations such as gravity and interest of victims and that the considerations of peace and security ordinarily are outside the scope of the Prosecutor’s considerations.279 The Deputy Prosecutor

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272. Id.
273. Id. at 8.
274. Id. at 9.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 15.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 16.
279. Id.
then referred to the explicit considerations of the Prosecutor as those stated in the 2007 Policy Paper.\textsuperscript{280}

The second notable interaction was the creation of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace by the Colombian government.\textsuperscript{281} The Special Jurisdiction was created to “investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible for the most serious human rights violations committed during the armed conflict in Colombia.”\textsuperscript{282} The creation of this Special Jurisdiction was expressly welcomed by the Prosecutor with the additional hope that amnesty would not be granted for international crimes committed.\textsuperscript{283}

In 2016, the Prosecutor welcomed the success of the peace negotiations and the continued discussions between OTP and the Colombian government in light of peace agreement and accountability for those most responsible.\textsuperscript{284} In 2017, the Prosecutor’s office annual report on preliminary investigations offered interesting analysis relating to the prosecution of false-positive cases.\textsuperscript{285} Unlike previous reports in which the Prosecutor was very optimistic about the prosecutions, the Prosecutor identified twenty-nine commanders potentially responsible for false-positive killings and further noted that only seventeen of these individuals were currently being prosecuted.\textsuperscript{286} The Prosecutor continued to criticize the supplemental legislation to the Special Jurisdiction that deviated

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\textsuperscript{280} \textit{Id.} at 17.
\textsuperscript{282} \textit{Id.} at 1.
\textsuperscript{286} \textit{Id.} ¶ 135.
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from the Rome Statute and customary international law.\footnote{287} In discussing the Prosecutor’s relationship with Colombia that year, it seems the Prosecutor had a much more authoritative role in suggesting that her office discovered a list of individuals that may be responsible for international crimes and if there were no prosecutions of these individuals these cases may thereby fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction.\footnote{288} The 2017 report seemed much more critical of the Colombian prosecutions than in previous years.

By 2018, the Colombian government had responded to the concerns raised by the Prosecutor in her 2017 report.\footnote{289} In relation to the Prosecutor’s concerns about legislation deviating from customary international law, the Colombian Constitutional Court upheld the narrower definition of command responsibility and amended its war crimes definition to no longer include a systematic requirement.\footnote{290} Overall, unlike the 2017 report which seems unusually critical of the Colombian response, the 2018 report returned to a much more supportive viewpoint.\footnote{291}

Before the 2019 report, the Prosecutor outlined in detail the series of steps taken by the Colombian government toward accountability for various international crimes.\footnote{292} Most notably, although many will likely be critical of this decision, the Prosecutor concluded that in light of the Colombian efforts, his office would look to end the preliminary investigations in Colombia in the subsequent year.\footnote{293} The closure of the preliminary matters was subject to the Colombian government meeting certain benchmarks, conditions, proceedings, and legislative developments.\footnote{294} Although the closure of the preliminary
examination did not officially occur until recently,\textsuperscript{295} the Prosecutor’s actions in the situation in Colombia may have created a strong foundation for the future working relationship between the ICC and countries afflicted with ongoing conflicts where the ICC is simultaneously considering exercising its jurisdiction.

In October 2021, the new ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan officially concluded the preliminary examination of the situation and entered into a Cooperation Agreement with Bogota.\textsuperscript{296} He explained that he was satisfied that "complementarity is working today in Colombia."\textsuperscript{297} The signature of this agreement, the first of its kind in OTP practice, reflected a series of undertakings by each side that would see the national authorities lead the accountability and domestic transitional justice processes.\textsuperscript{298} This decision can be seen as either a welcome or controversial decision, depending how one views the role of the ICC in a situation country. If the role is to be a catalyst to some domestic efforts, and to make complementarity meaningful and concrete without seeking uniformity in national judicial systems, then it would be a positive. And, perhaps, even a turning point for the ICC. If, on the other hand, the ICC is seen as a supervisory court that should override domestic efforts, for the sake of prosecutions, then the Colombia outcome could be seen as a negative. Sufficient time has not passed to pass judgment. Thus, in the view of this writer, the jury remains out on this and only after sufficient time has elapsed can informed observers determine whether this model was successful or not.

Overall, the progressive engagement and actions of the Prosecutor in the situation in Colombia seem to be in stark

\footnotesize{\begin{enumerate}
\item Id.
\item Id.; see also the Cooperation Agreement Between the OTP of the ICC and the Government of Colombia, https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/itemsDocuments/20211028-OTP-COL-Cooperation-Agreement-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WW7-W6VB].
\end{enumerate}}
contrast to the actions of the Prosecutor in Uganda and Sudan. This may be partially attributable to the fact that the Uganda situation was the first to come before the ICC while the Colombia situation arose much later. Different prosecutors held the position during each of the situations, although the Gambian prosecutor, who led the office for most of the period under discussion here, was a deputy at the time, but ultimately a review of their actions in the respective situations could provide insight for the Court on how to proceed in the future. The Prosecutor in the Colombian situation was clearly much more deferential to the actions of the Colombian government and willing to provide them with time to create a domestic accountability process.

Ultimately, seemingly with the assistance and oversight of the Prosecutor, the Colombian government was able to develop its national prosecutions and accountability mechanism and ensure compatibility with the Rome Statute. This not only strengthened the State relationship with the ICC but also appears to have positively impacted the national judicial system, which is an essential requirement of sustainable peace. The Prosecutor’s decision not to immediately proceed with a formal investigation in 2011 once she had established her “reasonable basis” should be instructive for future Prosecutors, as her “wait and see” approach seemed to contribute beneficially to the long-term goal of achieving justice. The latter has now led to the conclusion of the preliminary examination.

It will take some time before we can thoroughly assess whether this experience was a success. Much will depend on whether the government proceeds to fulfill its side of the agreement. If it does, without negatively affecting the situation

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299. See Diego Acosta Aracazo et al., Beyond Justice, Beyond Peace? Colombia, the Interests of Justice, and the Limits of International Criminal Law, 26 CARM. I. F. 291 (2015) (discussing excessive prosecutorial deference in the Colombian case); See also Open Soc’y Just. Initiative, Improving the Operations of the ICC OTP: Reappraisal of Structures, Norms, and Practices, 13(Apr. 15, 2020) (noting that the “exit” process should occur during the early states and involve affected communities, a buy-in approach, and provide victims an opportunity to speak and provide them with realistic expectations as to “what a post-ICC situation looks like”).

of victims, Colombia could come to serve as a turning point and perhaps even as a model of ICC engagement in other situations, including in Africa. On the other hand, if it proves to be a failure, it might lead to the opposite effect and even embolden those who prefer a top-down court that dictates to national justice systems.

IX. CONCLUSION

While there have been many African government complaints against the ICC, with some being more credible than others, this article has argued that the experience of African States and the Court over the past decade indicates there is a clear need for reform in relation to several critical issues, especially the question of how best to sequence peace and justice. The issue is not a new one. Yet, it was not tackled head on by the IER report, which seemed to prefer to skirt the more difficult issues in favor of addressing operational questions. There is no doubt that operational effectiveness is beneficial for the ICC and that careful implementation of the IER recommendations, with the cooperation of the relevant organs and in line with the letter and spirit of the Rome Statute, would be a welcome opportunity to enhance the effectiveness of the ICC. To avoid another decade of African State criticism of the Court, the ICC should provide unambiguous guidelines as to how the interests of justice are considered in ongoing conflicts. A balance must be struck between the imperative of the ICC to act, investigate, and prosecute, and the imperative of peace or rather a sustainable peace. At least in certain circumstances.

Further, as African States and others benefit from having clear criteria, that ultimately allows States to have more meaningful participation during accountability discussions and can further reduce the perception of politics in international prosecutions. Indeed, reforms should be aimed at fulfilling the Court mandate of acting as a Court of last, not first, resort. This means that the ICC could develop clear guidelines on the use of alternative justice mechanisms, peace processes, and transitional justice schemes. The Court can also empower States to maintain sovereignty and improve domestic institutions while nonetheless advancing the Court’s broad purpose of ensuring greater accountability and justice for the victims of some of the world’s worst crimes.
Now, at the turn of a new decade, is the opportunity for ICC reform to occur. Regrettably, in the reform report, the admittedly challenging and longstanding concerns of African States such as the peace-justice question discussed in this paper have not been addressed. Ironically, the African experience has been crucial to the transformation of the Rome Statute from ideals on paper to reality on the ground. Indeed, it is on the back of African atrocity crimes that the practice of the ICC has developed since the entry into force of the statute in July 2002. It is therefore only befitting that the region that has the most experience with the ICC give back and shares its valuable introspection into the work of the Court and how to better improve it. The African claims of selectivity, disruption of peace, and mandate for justice above all else are not unique but are certainly at the center of what could be the boldest accountability experiment in history.

This writer was unable to find any reason for this curious situation whereby the obvious concerns of African States expressed over many years did not feature, directly, in the final IER report. After months of work and 278 interviews, and meetings with 246 current and former officials of the ICC, 9 states parties and 12 ASP bodies and 54 NGOs, and with the presence of 3 eminent African jurists one of whom was chair, it is a rather strange outcome. The expert report suggests that the focus was on actionable proposals focused on systemic issues leaving the question open that they did not consider it their task to engage with substantive questions that could give rise to statutory amendments. Indeed, interestingly, the report indicates that this meant that they avoided amendment proposals to the Rome Statute or suggestions that could give rise to need for budgetary increases. Yet, in the report, there were a handful of proposals that called for statutory amendments on several specific issues. Some of the proposals requiring changes were to secondary documents such as the rules of procedure or internal ICC documents. In fairness, the experts did, in a single paragraph of their final report, attempt to address the relationship between the ICC and regional and other international organizations with a particular highlight of the AU. But this was in the context of emphasizing the importance

301. See, for instance, Recommendation 2154, 218 and 381, 379 of the IER Report, supra note 31.
in strengthening understanding of the value of and support for the ICC rather than engaging in the substantive concerns raised by African States.\textsuperscript{302}

Considering the detailed analysis provided above, which seeks to examine the African State perspective on the ICC’s timely reform process, there are at least four-preliminary recommendations that can be considered by African States and civil society as part of their efforts to push for ICC reform that will prove beneficial to African States, the ICC, and indeed the international criminal justice project which has now entered a critical phase. However, these recommendations might be prefaced with a brief note on strategy. Overall, the African State position may be best advanced by States Parties selecting a recommendation and jointly supporting that recommendation in both the plenary debate and private meetings of the ASP. Experience with past reform proposals indicate it is hardly enough for African States to present an issue during the plenary debate. The States must go further and partner to actively pursue their recommendations during the relevant meetings of the relevant state party driven working groups. Without support during both the plenary meetings and in private meetings, the African State recommendations will not likely succeed. The recommendations are as follows:

A. Recommendation 1: Revise the OTP Policy Paper on the “interests of justice”

A revision of the OTP Policy Paper to include clearer guidelines and broader criteria on what the Prosecutor will consider as falling within each element of the balancing test. Such a revision is essential for a broader and more uniform application of Article 53(1)(c) and (2)(c). It is suggested that the Prosecutor provide more substantive guidelines to the criteria that need to be met by States.\textsuperscript{303}

Moreover, it is suggested that the revised policy paper includes clear definitions on what alternative justice mechanisms

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{302} See para. 379 of the IER Report, \textit{supra} note 31, (which incidentally contained the sole reference to the “African Union” in the entire report).
\item \textsuperscript{303} OTP, \textit{Interests of Justice Policy Paper 2007}, \textit{supra} note 142, at 6 (discussing the specific example of the interest of victims in the LRA, Uganda cases).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
are suitable with transitional justice systems.\textsuperscript{304} Additionally, it is suggested that a revised policy paper should acknowledge that the ICC Statute does not debar the Prosecutor from taking peace negotiations into account as part of the interests of justice considerations under Article 53. The revision should then provide further guidance on how the peace processes may play a role in decisions regarding investigation and prosecution, with reference to recent best practices that have satisfied the Court.

For example, it has been suggested that the Prosecutor may consider the following non-exhaustive factors in assessing the extent to which peace processes will be considered when making determinations on the interests of justice:\textsuperscript{305}

\begin{itemize}
  \item the extent of support for the peace process from relevant stakeholders, particularly victims;
  \item social inclusiveness, meaning the degree of participation that the process affords to relevant stakeholders;
  \item transparency and public scrutiny;
  \item the inclusion within the process of a “justice component”;
  \item the security situation on the ground, particularly the risk of escalation of violence.
\end{itemize}

Finally, a revision to the processes of the OTP may also prove beneficial. Given the procedures of the Prosecutor in Colombia, it seems there could be a benefit to allowing the national jurisdiction an opportunity to develop its transitional justice schemes before the ICC immediately demands accountability.\textsuperscript{306}


\textsuperscript{305} Akande & De Souza Dias, supra note 100, 336–342.

\textsuperscript{306} See Open Soc’y Just. Initiative, supra note 299 (“Others reflected that there might be benefits to engaging with locally-based development or transitional justice actors to push the international justice project further in a given context. For example, experts suggested that reopening the conversation between the ICC and transitional justice actors could expose common
Recommendation 2: Revise the Rules of Procedure to clarify the meaning of "interests of justice"

The ICC Rules of Procedure, an instrument subordinate to the Rome Statute but is adopted by States Parties in the ASP, could be amended to clarify the meaning of the "interests of justice," to make a connection to complementarity requirements, and the wider powers of the OTP. A discussion of how limited amnesty or non-prosecution arrangements fit into the wider powers of the Prosecutor under Article 53 would provide useful guidance to States Parties that may come within the ICC jurisdiction during conflicts.

Alternatively, States Parties may adopt an interpretative declaration or understanding, along the lines of those adopted with the Kampala Aggression Amendments, which offers guidance to the Prosecutor and to State Parties as to the meaning of the interests of justice provision.

C. Recommendation 3: Amend the Rome Statute to allow for the ASP to recommend to the Security Council a case for deferral under Article 16

Since the ICC reform report presents recommendations for amendments to the Rome Statute, although not necessarily ones addressing the peace-justice issue, this might have opened the door for consideration of other amendments. In particular, this might be an opportunity for the ASP to develop some criteria that could be used to guide the exercise of deferral power, at least in relation to the role of peace negotiations to end armed conflict. In this regard, an amendment could be proposed to the Rome Statute. If that is not possible, a separate agreement or understanding, such as that which was adopted following the adoption of the Kampala Amendments, could be adopted and serve as a basis to offer guidance to the Security Council on the preference of Rome Statute members about the circumstances that would warrant grants of Article 16 deferral requests.

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ground and opportunities to take advantage of funding and support for the ICC's role in helping states achieve SDG16."
D. Recommendation 4: Amend the Rome Statute to require the Security Council to develop a clear application process for States requesting the organ to exercise its Article 16 authority

An amendment to Article 16 of the Rome Statute could provide a clearer road map for States requesting the organ exercise its deferral powers. It can, therefore, be recommended that the Security Council establish a non-enumerated list of publicly announced criteria that it expects States to provide in their submissions to the Security Council when requesting a deferral. Moreover, States should be clear in their request for deferrals that a deferral is not a grant of impunity, but an opportunity for States to develop their national system or stabilize the national system that could later support a State in fulfilling its obligations under the Rome Statute. This proposal will likely face push-back from some States over the concerns that a deferral will result in an indefinite suspension of justice and fraudulent peace negotiations. Therefore, States should be clear when proposing this amendment that the continued granting of a deferral request would be dependent on that State fulfilling its initial obligations under the first deferral and that if the State fails to comply with any of the requirements of the deferral mandate the deferral will not be renewed.

Moreover, the Security Council could even set shorter deadlines for States in three, six, or even nine-month increments to allow States and regional bodies to have clear expectations on their responsibilities and obligations during this deferral period. Further, the Security Council could leave open the opportunity for the deferral to be terminated earlier than twelve-months if the State fails to meet its interim obligations. All this is to say that there are many options available to the Security Council. Consequently, this concern of indefinite impunity can be overcome. In relation to the second concern about fraudulent peace negotiations, here too the Security Council could impose stricter requirements so that the peace process has both objective and subjective requirements to ensure there is a legitimate process being engaged.307

307. See AU Transitional Policy Paper, supra note 23, ¶¶ 42–100 (“Assessments should be done transparently, using clear criteria on an individual basis by a legitimate and publicly accountable institution.”).
Ultimately, this formalized request process could eliminate some of the political barriers facing the organ and allow for a more methodological assessment of situations on a case-by-case basis. This criterion should provide an opportunity for regional groups to provide recommendations or views on the deferral requests. Moreover, it should encourage the Security Council to give greater weight to the recommendations of regional arrangements attempting to pursue a larger scheme of peace and justice in their region in line with the recognition of their place in Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations.

Finally, the criteria should include a requirement that the Security Council must submit a formal report on the deferral of a situation, the State comments submitted, and the reasoning of the organ’s ultimate decision. On the Security Council side, an ad hoc panel of independent experts appointed every three years with one member from each region (similar to that created by the ASP for the election of the prosecutor), could even be tasked with studying the requests and providing non-binding recommendations on whether to grant the deferral request.